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answer this question in terms of obligation—of a duty on the part of states to confer
citizenship. Moreover, scholars tend to lump together the bundle of rights conventionally
associated with citizenship when they answer this question. In contrast, this Article
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interests. States want to encourage migrants to enter their territory and to make countryspecific investments, but have an interest in being able to remove immigrants or make their
lives less comfortable if circumstances change. However, migrants will not enter and make
country-specific investments if the state can easily remove them or change the conditions in
which they live. Accordingly, the “optimal contract” reflects the tradeoffs between
commitment and flexibility. We discuss ways in which basic rights to liberty and property,
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. government’s treatment of migrants and other noncitizens has
provoked a great deal of public attention in recent years. In the wake of 9/11,
the Bush administration adopted discriminatory policies that placed special
burdens on people from countries with a significant Al Qaeda presence—that
is, certain Muslim countries.1 Those who had entered illegally were rounded
up and expelled; others were interrogated or subjected to surveillance. Even
before 9/11, the U.S. government’s treatment of noncitizens was a topic of
frequent debate. Many critics, for example, complained about the use of
deportation to punish noncitizens who committed crimes or to expel potential
terrorist threats.2 The government’s inconsistent approach to noncitizens who
had entered illegally, sometimes tolerating and encouraging them, sometimes
dealing harshly with them, also received criticism.
At the same time, it is bedrock policy that citizens and noncitizens are to
be treated differently. Virtually no one believes that noncitizens should have
the right to vote or to run for office. Many noncitizens, including tourists,
business people, and the spouses of certain visa holders, do not even have the
right to work, or to change jobs. All noncitizens face the risk of deportation if
they violate the law; citizens, by contrast, can never be exiled. The Supreme
Court has recognized that the constitutional rights of noncitizens are limited.
Foreign countries, like the United States, draw a sharp line between citizens
and noncitizens, and recognize that citizens have more rights than noncitizens
do.
If citizens and noncitizens may be treated differently, how differently may
they be treated? Most scholars answer this question on the basis of doctrine
or political theory. Doctrinal accounts attempt to derive noncitizens’ rights

See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS (2004); Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration
and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is
Alien a Distinction Without Difference, 38 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 620–632 (2005); Adam B.
Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373 (2004); Lawrence M.
Lebowitz & Ira L. Podheiser, A Summary of the Changes in Immigration Policies and Practices after the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001: The USA Patriot Act and other Measures, 63 U. PITT. L. REV.
873 (2002).
2 See Andrew David Kennedy, Expedited Injustice: The Problems Regarding the Current Law of
Expedited Removal of Aggravated Felons, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1847 (2007).
1
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form constitutional and legal traditions.3 Political theories derive noncitizens’
rights from various theoretical conceptions of democracy and citizenship.4
Largely overlooked, however, are equally important descriptive questions:
why do governments, such as the U.S. government, grant rights at all to
noncitizens? Why have the rights of noncitizens improved over the years, and
why do they still fall short of the rights enjoyed by citizens? In other words, if
we assume that policy toward noncitizens reflect the interests of states, what
policies would we predict, and how do we explain variations across states and
across time? These questions have received little attention from legal scholars.
On a naïve view, for example, one might think that states would give
noncitizens no rights at all. Why give rights to people who do not belong to
one’s political community? However, it is clear that states give rights to
noncitizens, and particularly migrants, in order to give them certain incentives:
to enter the country, to work there and pay taxes, to augment the population.
At the same time, the granting of rights to migrants constrains states.
Migration policies that serve the national interest during times of peace and
economic prosperity may quickly become unpopular when those times change.
States prefer flexibility ex post, so that they can change migration policy when
circumstances call for change, but if they insist on such flexibility and hence
grant minimal rights to migrants, migrants will have weak incentives to enter
the country in the first place.
Migrants’ rights vary along two dimensions. First, they differ in their
scope. In the United States, migrants are classified in many different ways, and
each class enjoys a different bundle of rights. People who enter the country
illegally have certain basic rights—to life, to property, to minimal process—but
little more. People who enter legally have more generous rights but their
rights are more limited than those of citizens. For example, tourists and the
spouses of certain migrants have basic rights to life, property, criminal and civil
process, and so forth, but do not have the right to work for pay, and they do
not have the right to remain in the country beyond the period of their visa.
See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS,
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996).
4 See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002); HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE
UNITED STATES (2007); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS
(1998); PETER SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION
(2008); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
(1984); Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. OF POLITICS
251 (1987); Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the
Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1997).
3
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Migrants with a work visa have the right to work in certain positions but often
no right to change jobs. Lawful permanent residents have the right to work as
well as the other rights, but do not enjoy the right to vote. And whereas
citizens cannot be “removed” (exiled), lawful permanent residents and other
migrants can be removed (deported) for committing certain crimes, posing a
security threat, and so forth. Lawful permanent residents are granted an
additional important right: the right to become citizens after they have resided
in this country for five years, passed a citizenship exam, and satisfied certain
other conditions. Some migrants, but not others, are granted the right to
acquire full citizenship rights through naturalization.5
Migrants’ rights also vary along a second dimension: their “strength,” or,
more precisely, the ease with which the government can change them. At one
extreme, rights could be administrative: the executive branch determines the
rights of migrants at any time and can change them. Rights can also be
statutory: Congress determines and changes rights. And rights can be
constitutional, in which case they can be changed only by amendment or
through judicial interpretation of the Constitution. Migrants enjoy all three
types of rights. The Constitution sets some basic minima for process rights,
for example, which statutes and administrative regulations have developed.6 In
addition to investigating the content of migrant rights, then, this Article also
analyzes variation in their strength.
One type of right cuts across these two categories. Voting rights (as well
as other rights of political participation) are important citizenship rights. The
holder of voting rights has the power to affect political outcomes by
influencing the selection of public officials. In one sense, voting rights are an
aspect of the content of migrant rights: migrants who can vote have rights that
other migrants lack. In another sense, voting rights affect the strength of
rights, including themselves. Although in theory Congress could eliminate a
migrant’s voting right by repealing the statute that created it, doing so will be
more difficult than repealing other types of migrant rights because migrants
will likely vote against politicians who appear inclined to repeal their voting
rights.
In the United States, nonresident aliens and other migrants rarely have
voting rights, and when they do, they are at the municipal level and limited.
However, in the past migrants have been granted more substantial voting
rights at the state level, as we will discuss. In addition, voting rights remain an
important aspect of the incentive system used to lure migrants to the United
5
6

See infra Part I.A. & I.B.
See infra Part I.B.

6 April 2009

The Rights of Migrants

4

States, in the following sense: migrants are promised that if they qualify as
citizens and become citizens, they will have the right to vote. We can thus
think of contingent, deferred voting rights as an aspect of the bundle of
migrant rights.
To explain the content and strength of migrant rights, we borrow the
optimal contract framework developed by economists to analyze contractual
behavior.7 Although migrants do not enter contracts with the U.S.
government, their relationship with the U.S. government is analogous to a
contractual relationship. Both sides gain from an implicit deal. The migrant
enters the United States, invests in learning English and other aspects of
American culture, and obtains a return in the form of higher wages, shares of
public goods, and other benefits. The U.S. government—which we use as a
stand-in for native citizens—gains in diverse ways. Tax revenues help finance
public goods, labor costs are reduced, and the migrant contributes to cultural
and social life.
In thinking about these issues, most people focus on the question of how
the government should select among migrants. The world presents a large
pool of potential immigrants, and states have to figure out how to separate
those immigrants it considers desirable from those it does not.8 The debate
focuses on the desirability of certain characteristics—for example, skills and
familial relationships with American citizens. But there is another problem of
equal importance, which is how the “contract” between the migrant and the
U.S. government should be designed, once a particular migrant is selected.
The main problem for the government is that a migrant who is highly desirable
at time 1 might turn out to be undesirable at time 2. All else equal, the
government would like to retain the option to remove any migrant if events
change—a financial downturn, a security threat—such that the benefits from
the migrant’s presence no longer exceed the costs.
However, the problem with such flexibility is that a migrant will not enter
a country, or will enter but decline to sink roots in that country, if she knows
that she can be removed at any time. Many migrants do best by making what
we will call “country-specific investments”—like learning the dominant
language and developing social networks—but a typically risk-averse migrant
will not make such investments if she can be easily removed. Moreover,
migrants will worry that the government will wield its removal power
opportunistically, trumping up security threats or exaggerating financial
downturns in order to justify deportation.
See, e.g., PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY (2005).
We focus on those screening issues in Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order
Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2007).
7
8
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Governments, too, often want migrants to make country-specific
investments, so it is in their interest to guarantee a migrant’s right to remain
even if bad events occur—at least, to a limit. It will therefore sometimes be in
a state’s interest to tie its hands so that it cannot use its deportation power
opportunistically. All else equal, the optimal contract will trade off the
government’s need for flexibility and the migrant’s need for commitment. It
does so in two ways: by granting migrants more or less generous rights; and by
making it harder or easier for the government to change them.
Our approach helps expand the possibilities for legal design by showing
why different packages of rights might be conferred on different groups of
migrants. Much existing scholarship suggests that there is a relatively static,
hierarchical relationship between various migrants’ rights.9 On these accounts
rights increase in lock-step with increasing “membership” in the receiving
state. Rights are also arranged hierarchically, with rights like political
participation almost always associated with higher levels of membership than
rights like occupational freedom. Our account abandons this idea of a lexical
relationship between various rights associated with citizenship. It also
abandons the prevalent assumption in the literature that all migrants should be
accorded the same rights. Migrants come with various desires: some hope to
come and work in a receiving state for a short time, others hope to remain for
a long time but imagine eventually returning home, and others intend to
remain permanently. Each of these groups of migrants will value rights
differently: for some the right to remain for a guaranteed period of time will be
far more important than occupational freedom; others will have the opposite
preferences. As a result, our approach makes it possible to see why we should
expect variation in the optimal contracts—variation that is hard to evaluate
within the literature’s existing frameworks.
The rest of this paper unpacks our argument. Part I introduces the
relevant conceptual distinctions and motivates the argument with a brief
description of American immigration law and legal history. Part II provides a
simple theoretical account of the “optimal contract” between migrant and
government. Part III addresses some real-world complications by relaxing the
basic model’s assumption that the contract involves only two parties. Part IV
discusses ways in which the immigration policies of different countries
interact.

9 To be clear, there is some ambiguity in this literature about whether it is intended as a
descriptive account of existing practices or instead as a normative account of what the
structure of migrants’ rights should look like. Often the literature appears to make both
claims.
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This paper builds on the economic approach to immigration law that we
originated in an earlier paper.10 In this approach, the relationship between the
receiving country and the migrant is treated as though it were a contractual
relationship, which allows one to use ideas from the optimal contract literature
in economics. As in all contractual relationships, the two parties have partially
overlapping interests. States gain by allowing migrants to enter, and migrants
gain by entering states, but each side of the transaction does better by retaining
flexibility unavailable to other. The contracting problem is to choose
“terms”—that is, immigration laws—that maximize the joint benefit.
The theme of this paper is that the “optimal contract” between migrant
and government—that is, the package of rights that the migrant receives—is
shaped by a central precommitment problem and depends on (and hence
changes with) a host of exogenous variables. Rights will be weaker, for
example, when governments expect that the risk of future adverse events are
high, and stronger when governments gain more when migrants make
country-specific investments. With an understanding of the relationship
between the variables, one can explain some of the variation in the rights
granted to migrants.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Conceptual Distinctions
In determining how many people to admit, and what type, the “host” (or
“receiving”) country must also resolve a number of difficult questions
regarding how these people, once on the host country’s territory, are to be
treated. Consider the following baseline: migrants are treated the same as
citizens. The baseline system entails that once a person is lawfully admitted
into the host country, she would have the right to vote, to criminal process,
and so forth; she would also have certain obligations—to follow the law, to
pay taxes, to serve on the jury. She could not be removed, for removal is
identical to exile, and citizens may not be exiled.
10 See Cox & Posner, supra note 8. As we explain in that paper, much of the existing literature
focuses on first-order issues—the optimal number and types of migrants—while in this
research agenda we evaluate second-order issues, that is, issues of structure and design. For
some related work in the law and economics literature, see Mohammad Amin & Aaditya
Mattoo, Can Guest Worker Schemes Reduce Illegal Migration?, (World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 3828, February 2006); Nancy Chau, Strategic Amnesty and Credible Immigration
Reform, 19 J. LABOR ECON. 604 (2001); Gordon M. Myers & Yorgos Y. Papageorgiou,
Immigration Control and the Welfare State, 75 J. PUB. ECON. 183 (2000). For emerging work by
immigration scholars, see Eleanor Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance (working paper,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1131022.
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In practice, this baseline never prevails. No state treats migrants exactly
the same as citizens. To clarify the differences, we make several conceptual
distinctions:
Rights versus obligations. Citizens have various obligations. Broadly, they
must obey the law, which usually involves paying taxes, sitting on juries (in the
United States), serving in the military (in many countries), and so forth.
Citizens also have rights, such as the right to free speech, to a trial prior to
punishment for crime, and to own property. There have been cases in history
where noncitizens have had privileges not to obey the laws, or all the laws, that
bind citizens.11 Today, these privileges are relatively minor—such as the
privilege not to serve on a jury in the United States. For the most part, we will
assume that citizens and noncitizens have the same obligation to comply with
general law, such as tax law. Our focus is on rights.
Rights to political participation. In democracies, citizens have the right to
vote, to join political organizations, to make political arguments, and to
participate in other ways in the democratic process. Noncitizens generally
have no voting rights; there are some minor exceptions.12 Noncitizens may
also be subject to certain restrictions on lobbying.13 For the most part,
however, noncitizens enjoy the same speech and association rights that citizens
do.14 In principle, political participation rights could be disaggregated.
Noncitizens could be given the right to vote but not to join parties, for
example; or to vote on certain issues but not on certain other issues, or to vote
for candidates for some offices but not for candidates of other offices.
Rights to remain. In the United States and most other countries, citizens
have a right not to be exiled. Historically, exile was a common punishment,15
but no more. By contrast, noncitizens have circumscribed rights to remain. In
the United States, noncitizens may be removed if they pose a security threat or
commit a serious crime.16 In addition, noncitizens may be removed if their
visa expires and they do not obtain the right to permanent residence; and
noncitizens who leave American territory may, under certain circumstances, be
Foreign diplomats are the classic example here. See 22 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2001).
13 See Bruce D. Brown, Alien Donors: The Participation of Non-Citizens in the U.S. Campaign
Finance System, 15 YALE L. & POL. REV. 503 (1997).
14 See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (“Freedom of speech and of press is
accorded aliens residing in this country.” (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263
(1941)).
15 See, e.g., GORDON P. KELLY, A HISTORY OF EXILE IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC (2006).
16 See Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000) (enumerating
grounds of deportability).
11
12
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denied reentry, unlike citizens.17 These rights could be further disaggregated;
one could imagine that one has the right to remain unless, for example, a war
involving one’s country occurs.
“Basic” rights. Citizens in the United States and most other democracies
have many other rights, including the right to criminal process if they are
accused of a crime, the right to own property and to receive compensation if it
is confiscated by the state, the right to bring civil actions, and so forth. In
principle, noncitizens could be denied these rights, or given weaker
protections; at least in the United States today, they generally are not—though
there are exceptions and ambiguities.18 The most important exception is the
right to work: many migrants do not have the right to work or they do not
have the right to change jobs.19 We will call these general or baseline rights
“basic rights.”
The temporal dimension of rights. As a broad generalization, noncitizens gain
more and stronger rights, the longer they lawfully remain in the host country.20
One might distinguish people on temporary visas, lawful permanent residents,
and citizens. Migrants in these different categories are often accorded
different rights;21 in addition, they are also often given the right to move from
one category to another.22 Our focus will be principally on lawful permanent
17 See INA § 101(a)(13) (specifying circumstances under which even a lawful permanent
resident who travels abroad will be considered to be “seeking admission” and, therefore,
subject to the grounds of inadmissibility); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)
(upholding the government’s decision to deny re-entry to a long-time permanent resident who
traveled abroad).
18 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, sec. 2 (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases . . .
between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.”); Wong Wing
v. United States, 163 U. S. 228 (1896) (holding that noncitizens are entitled to the
Constitution’s criminal procedure protections); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282
U.S. 481, 491–92 (1931) (holding that the Takings Clause applies to property in the United
States owned by noncitizens). Historically, of course, some of these basic rights were
restricted. For example, property ownership by noncitizens was a quite controversial in early
America.
19 See, Juan C. Linares, Hired Hands Needed: The Impact of Globalization and Human Rights Law on
Migrant Workers in the United States, 34 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 321, 329–37 (2006).
20 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien gains admission to our
country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional
status changes accordingly.”).
21 For example, lawful permanent residents can remain indefinitely and are free to work
almost anywhere (or not at all); many migrants in the United States on temporary employment
visas, however, must leave the country after a few months or years and are not free to change
jobs. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY (6th ed. 2008).
22 See INA § 245 (adjustment of status); INA § 316 (naturalization rules).
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residents, who are people given permission to remain in the country
indefinitely. But an important issue is whether and on what conditions
migrants are permitted to move from one category to another.
The expressive value of citizenship. Citizenship may have distinctive value
irrespective of the legal rights and obligations associated with it. Imagine that
the formal status of “citizen,” a label, is a separate legal right. That label might
itself be important, even if it does not directly create any formal rights or
obligations.23 For example, the state could use the formal status as a signaling
mechanism—as a signal to others about the person accorded the status, or as a
signal to the person herself.24 To keep our analysis within reasonable bounds,
we will ignore the expressive dimension of citizenship. Citizenship is a
valuable status in large part because of the legal rights and privileges associated
with it. Those rights will be our focus.
As we proceed with our analysis, we will hold the baseline rights of
citizens constant and ask, what explains the difference between the migrant’s
rights and the citizen’s rights.
B. The Contingency of Migrant Rights in the United States
Our general approach assumes that migrant rights are a policy choice.
While this assumption is certainly an oversimplification, it is not contrived.
The legal relationship in the United States between the bundled rights often
associated with citizenship is complex, but a central feature is clear: the
government retains considerable flexibility to adjust these rights.
This is true even if we treat constitutional law as an exogenous constraint
on government action. American constitutional law imposes only modest
restrictions on Congress’ authority to grant to, or withhold rights from,
migrants who have not acquired the formal legal status of citizenship.
Constitutional law requires the most with respect to basic rights: it obligates
the state to afford all resident noncitizens basic criminal protections;25 to
refrain from discriminating against noncitizens on the basis of race,26 and so
on. As we saw before, the main exception is the right to work.
Consider the analogy to contemporary debates about gay marriage, where some argue that
the legal label of “marriage” is important even if identical legal rights and obligations attach to
both marriage and some other status like domestic partnership. See George W. Dent, Jr., “How
Does Same-Sex Threaten You?”, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 233, 252–253 (2007).
24 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2002); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
25 See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
26 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
23
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But modern constitutional law places few limits on the government’s
ability to adjust up or down the right to remain and the participation rights of
noncitizens. The right to remain is almost entirely unprotected by the
Constitution. The Supreme Court does place some procedural restrictions on
deportation and may (though it is contested) prohibit the government from
deporting noncitizens on the basis of their race or the content of their
speech.27 Those limits aside, the government is free to remove noncitizens
from the country for essentially any reason, and it can change retroactively the
grounds of deportation.28 Matters are similar for political rights. There are a
few constitutional protections: the First Amendment protects noncitizens’
freedom to speak out on political matters.29 Migrants cannot be excluded from
some forms of government employment.30 Nonetheless, the government can
deny the most valuable right of participation: the right to vote.31 And the
government also has wide latitude to restrict the rights of noncitizens to
contribute to election campaigns.32
For citizens, matters are quite different. American constitutional law
provides citizens an absolute right against exile and confers on them
considerably more robust protection for political rights.33 Moreover, it
prevents governments from circumventing these rights by stripping people of
citizenship.34
It is important to note, however, that nothing prevents the government
from giving this more generous suite of rights to noncitizens. While
constitutional law provides a floor of certain rights, it generally does not
establish a ceiling. It need not be this way. The Constitution could prohibit
the government from granting voting rights to noncitizens, or even from
See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (procedural due process protections); Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (selective deportation on
the basis of First Amendment activity).
28 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (retroactive change to
deportability grounds).
29 See supra note 14.
30 See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1980); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973).
31 See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical
Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PENN. L. REV. 1391 (1993).
32 See Note, “Foreign” Campaign Contributions and the First Amendment, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1886
(1997).
33 See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, RICHARD H. PILDES & PAMELA S. KARLAN, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2007).
34 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
27
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offering them the right of permanent residence without naturalization. And
the Constitution does contain at least one such ceiling: it prohibits noncitizens
from holding certain elected offices. A person must have been a citizen for
many years to be eligible for election to the Senate or the House of
Representatives (nine years for the Senate, seven years for the House).35 To be
eligible for the Presidency, a person must be not only a long term resident but
a “natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the
adoption of [the] Constitution.”36 In general, however, the absence of such
ceilings is part of what gives the government such flexibility.
In practice, the United States often does grant legal rights that are more
generous than what the Constitution requires. The generosity of rights mainly
depends on visa status. In addition, migrants’ rights generally strengthen with
their length of residency. This is true for access to public assistance, which
federal law makes available to permanent residents after five years;37 for the
right to reside, which immigration law protects somewhat more for long term
residents;38 and for the right to vote, which is usually provided only upon
naturalization after an extended period of residence.39 Finally, the rights are
often treated by American law as though they have a sort of necessary
hierarchy—with basic rights at the bottom, the right to reside in the middle,
and participation rights at the top. But there is nothing about American
constitutional law that makes this hierarchy necessary.
The current law should not blind one to the possibility of different
patterns, and indeed American history supplies a striking example that is
germane to our focus on migrant voting rights. In the nineteenth century,
when many parts of the country were sparsely populated, encouraging
settlement was a priority. Migrants could provide much-needed labor and, it
was hoped, “raise land values, stimulate economic development, and generate
tax revenues.”40 In 1789, the first Congress authorized aliens to vote in the
Northwest territories.41 And beginning in the 1820s, western states began
U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. 5.
37 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1612
(1996).
38 See INA § 240A (describing “cancellation of removal,” which allows long term residents
to avoid deportation in some situations where they have engaged in otherwise deportable
conduct).
39 See INA §316 (setting out the durational residency requirement for naturalization).
40 KEYSSAR, supra note 12, at 38.
41 See Raskin, supra note 31, at 1402 (“The [Congress’s re-enactment of the 1787 Northwest]
Ordinance gave freehold aliens who had been residents for two years the right to vote for
35
36
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conferring voting rights on so-called “declarant” noncitizens. Immigrants in
this period could officially declare their intention to become citizens (by filing
what were known as “first papers”) after living in the United States for two
years.42 Just like today they were ineligible to naturalize until they satisfied the
full five year residency requirement. But western states trimmed their wait for
voting rights to a short two years by conditioning the franchise on the
declaration rather than on naturalization.43
The spread of declarant voting laws suggests that the franchise was a
valuable inducement for immigrants. During a fight over the adoption of such
a rule in Illinois, one legislator remarked that the right to vote was “the
greatest inducement for men to come amongst us.”44 Thus, competition for
settlers seems to have played an important role in the expansions of noncitizen
voting. While noncitizen voting rules eventually waned, at their peak they
were adopted by more than a dozen states and were common everywhere
outside the densely populated Northeast.45
So the U.S. government, and the states as well, have had a great deal of
flexibility in granting rights to migrants, and have used this flexibility for the
purpose of attracting migrants and encouraging them to invest. We turn now
to an analysis of the costs and benefits of the different rights allocations.
II. THE BASIC THEORY
To explore the question why migrants might be accorded a particular suite
of rights, this Part first examines the reasons that noncitizens would value
different types of rights in different ways. Noncitizens may value rights
differently, depending on their purposes for entering a country, and the
various institutional, political, and economic aspects of that country that attract
(or repel) them. The Part then turns from migrants to states, examining the
“costs” that states incur when they grant rights to noncitizens. Here, we focus
on the citizens of these states and ask what they lose when they give rights to
noncitizens, and thus what rights they would be willing to grant to noncitizens
in order to obtain the benefits of migration into their country. Putting these
arguments together, we develop several hypotheses that explain what

representatives to territorial legislatures, and gave wealthier resident aliens who had been
residents for three years the right to serve in these bodies.”).
42 See MOTOMURA, supra note 4, at 115–16 (describing the declaration process).
43 KEYSSAR, supra note 12, at 33.
44 Id. at 38.
45 Id. at 33.
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conditions might prompt a state to give a particular bundle of rights to
migrants.
We begin with a simplified setup where a host country like the United
States has migration policies that reflect the interests of its citizens. We
assume that citizens benefit from a certain amount and type of migration.
This assumption is uncontroversial; very few states, if any, prohibit
immigration. However, there is a great deal of variation in how states benefit
from immigration. Let us suppose that our hypothetical host state, modeled
on the United States, gains from both unskilled and skilled labor. A larger
workforce reduces the cost of goods and increases tax revenues that finance
public goods, and while migration also reduces wages and increases
congestion, we will imagine that our host country will choose a quantity of
migration that maximizes net benefits. Note also that the host country will
have varying preferences for different types of migrants, including skilled
versus unskilled, temporary workers versus people who intend to establish
permanent residence, people who have family relationships with citizens, and
refugees.
A. Demand Side: What Migrants Want
Migrants benefit from rights for the same reason that citizens do: rights
protect them from the actions of individuals and governments that might
harm their interests. All else equal, a migrant will gain when the host country
grants her legal and constitutional rights. Legal rights protect her from other
people, arbitrary actions by the executive branch, and so forth; constitutional
rights protect her from the state.
Let us make these points more concrete. A person who lives in a foreign
country and contemplates migrating to a receiving state must make two
decisions: whether to enter or not, and the degree of country-specific
investment to make. The first dimension is straightforward; the second
requires some discussion.
Entering and living in a foreign country entails two types of costs: variable
costs and fixed costs. Variable costs include the day-to-day costs of living and
working—renting a residence, buying food, and dealing with other people.
Many of these costs are financial; others are psychological or emotional but
just as real—for example, the cost of being far away from one’s family or from
native speakers of one’s language or from people of a common culture.
Fixed costs are those expenses that a person incurs in the course of
obtaining skills or assets that enable her to reduce her variable costs over the
long term. In this straightforward sense, the fixed costs are investments: one
incurs the costs at some early time, and enjoys the returns (in the form of
reduced variable costs) over a period of time. For example, a person might
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learn the language of the host country—prior to entry or after entry. Learning
the language is an investment; once the person learns the language, the variable
costs of living in the host country will be lower. It will be easier to deal with
people, fewer mistakes will be made, and translators and interpreters need not
be hired. Other fixed costs include learning and absorbing cultural and social
norms that enable one to interact more effectively with people in the host
country.
These fixed costs are often, but not always, country-specific. A countryspecific investment is an investment (in money, time, effort) that generates a
return that has value only (or mainly) in a particular country.46 An American
who learns Japanese in anticipation of moving to Japan makes a countryspecific investment: the American can enjoy the benefits of knowing Japanese
only to the extent that she stays in Japan. To be sure, she may also enjoy these
benefits by staying in her own country and dealing with Japanese people in
commercial or social settings, or by enjoying Japanese literature, but these
benefits are trivial compared to the gains from being employed in Japan. A
Japanese citizen who learns English also makes an investment, but this
investment is not nearly as country-specific: she can travel to the United States,
the United Kingdom, Australia, and other English-speaking countries, and
indeed probably can obtain quite substantial returns even by staying in Japan.
Still, we will generally refer to language-learning and related activities as
country-specific investments.
As noted above, country-specific investments can take place prior to
admission to the host country. But probably the most significant countryspecific investments occur after admission. Many migrants learn the host
country language only after migration; others improve their linguistic skills by
interacting with citizens of the host country.47 Also of great importance,
migrants make country-specific investments by learning social and cultural
norms, acquiring friends and associates among members of the host country,
and in a general way obtaining local knowledge that is necessary to live
successfully.48 All these investments are country-specific because they are
lost—that is, the return on the investments cannot be obtained, or can be
obtained only in greatly diminished form—if the migrant is forced to leave the
country prematurely.
Our basic claim is that many (but not all) potential migrants can benefit
most from migration if they make country-specific investments and remain in
For a discussion of this concept, see Cox & Posner, supra note 8, at 828.
See RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM:
ASSIMILATION AND CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION (2003).
48 See id.
46
47
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the country long enough to obtain the full return on those investments, which
may often be a lifetime. A migrant in this group will therefore naturally worry
that the premise of a country-specific investment—that she will remain in the
country for a long period of time (if she so chooses) and that, as we will
explain, certain social and institutional features of the host country remain
constant—may be incorrect. She will therefore only make country-specific
investments if she can predict that this premise will remain correct with a high
enough probability. (Other migrants, however, may have no desire to make a
country-specific investment and seek instead to migrate temporarily in order to
engage in (typically) low-skill labor; these migrants are not the focus of our
analysis.)
It should now be clear that our framework provides one central reason
why migrants value rights. Rights protect their country-specific investments.
Of course, minimal basic rights—such as the right to own property—matter to
the migrant. If she cannot keep the returns on her investment—such as her
paycheck—she will not make the investment. But these minimal rights will
often be insufficient.
The right to remain is also valuable. One might think that as long as a
migrant can keep her paychecks and sell her property before being removed,
she should not need a right to remain. After all, these benefits should cover
her variable costs from living in the host country, and so she gains on net.
However, she values the right to remain in part because she cannot recover her
country-specific investments unless she can stay in the host country for a long
enough period of time. The longer the right to remain, the more valuable is
the country-specific investment, and therefore—a point we will get to in the
next section—the greater the country-specific investment that the migrant will
make.
Political rights will also often be quite important to migrants. Even a
migrant who enjoys the basic right to keep her property and the right to
remain takes risks from migration. The migrant also cares about her quality of
life in the host country, and this includes such things as the quality of the
schools (if she has children), the convenience of parks, the degree of public
safety, and other goods supplied by the government. In particular, migrants
will always be concerned about xenophobic reactions that result in harassment
of migrants or new laws that limit their freedom.49 History shows with great
clarity that a population that welcomes migrants when jobs are plentiful and
the world is at peace will often turn against them during an economic
See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM,
1860–1925 (1981).
49
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downturn or an international crisis.50 Strong migrant rights bar such a reaction
or mitigate its consequences.
Basic rights to ownership and the like, and the right to remain, will, if
enforced, prevent the worst forms of harassment. But migrants would prefer
greater protection. One might imagine that migrants would want some sort of
guarantee that the host country does not change in some undesirable way.
However, this is surely impractical. Conditions change and governments must
adopt new policies to address new problems that arise. Thus, the migrant’s
most realistic protection against new policies that reflect change but that
unreasonably disappoint the migrant’s expectations is the right to vote and
engage in other forms of political participation. The migrant can use her vote
to block policy changes that benefit citizens very little while harming migrants
a great deal, but not to block policy changes that benefit citizens a great deal
while harming migrants only a little—policy changes that are most likely
justified by new conditions. To be sure, one vote doesn’t make a difference;
but when a large number of migrants have located in the host country, or
within a particular town or other area of the host country, their combined
voting power may limit the amount of official and unofficial harassment that
would occur during a period of stress.51
Our final point is that basic rights, the right to remain, and political rights
matter more to people who make greater country-specific investments, and
therefore need a longer period of time, and freedom, in order to obtain the
return. If migrants do not make country-specific investments, they may still
value rights, but they will not value rights as much. For that reason,
permanent migrants value rights more than temporary migrants. Permanent
migrants seek to establish a permanent residence in the host countries; for
them country-specific investments are highly valuable. Temporary migrants
seek to stay only for a limited period—to work, to obtain an education, to
tour, to visit friends—and for them country-specific investments are often
much less valuable. For example, a Russian exchange student is likely to value
rights much less than a Japanese academic who joins a university faculty and
expects to remain in the United States for the indefinite future.

See A. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN (2006); GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:
FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM
(2004).
51 As the discussion below will make clear, uncertainty about the future and changing
circumstances are not the only reason migrants might value political rights. They are also
valuable as a precommitment device. For case of exposition, however, we discuss
precommitment in Part II.C below.
50
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To sum up, in our simple setup, migrants who make greater countryspecific investments value rights more than migrants who make more limited
or no country-specific investments. But migrants will value all rights at least a
little. This point can be put in another way. Holding the type of migrant
constant, a migrant or potential migrant will make greater country-specific
investments, the greater are the rights protections in the host country.
B. Supply Side: What States Want
When states grant rights to migrants, they incur costs. Some of these
costs are straightforward. If a migrant has a right to enjoy her property, then
the state cannot confiscate her property and distribute revenues to grateful
citizens. If a migrant has the right to criminal process, then the state cannot
summarily throw her in jail if it suspects she committed a crime or poses a
threat to others. Also the state must divert valuable police and judicial
resources to the protection of migrants from citizens who seek to harass them.
Thus, the state will incur costs if it confers basic rights on migrants.
Why, then, do states give migrants these basic rights? We could imagine a
host country announcing that migrants are welcome but they have no rights.
As a matter of historical practice, this type of situation sometimes occurs.52
But it is hard to imagine that the host country would attract many migrants. A
migrant who entered a country where she was given literally no rights would
take the risk of being immediately stripped of all her possessions. The
government could take all her possessions and enslave or kill her. Ordinary
people could do the same, and she would have no ability to call the
government to her aid. Thus, a state would attract no migrants—except in
unusual cases, such as a Wild West situation where people band into groups
for protection and try to quickly exploit natural resources—unless it gave
migrants at least minimal basic rights. For that reason, basic rights would seem
to be a sine qua non of migration.53
As we noted from the start, all states benefit from migration but states
have different needs and interests. Consider a state that needs only seasonal
52 Descriptions of gold mining in California during the gold rush sometimes have this flavor.
See, e.g., JOHN UMBECK, A THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH APPLICATION TO THE
CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH (1981).
53 However, as noted above, some basic rights—including the right to choose one’s
employer, or even to work at all—can be restricted. And historically other basic rights, such as
the right to own property, were often restricted. Cf. Oyama v. State of California, 332 U.S.
633 (1948) (holding unconstitutional part of California’s Alien Land Laws, which prohibited
land ownership by persons ineligible for citizenship—which under naturalization rules at the
time meant principally Japanese immigrants).
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unskilled labor from people who live just across the border. Suppose further
that these people would earn a higher wage in the host state than they do at
home. Such people, if granted only basic rights, would likely be willing to
engage in seasonal migration, for their and the host state’s mutual benefit.
Now let us consider the right to remain. Let us imagine that the state faces
two possible futures: a “good condition,” where the current demand for the
migrants’ labor continues; and a “bad condition,” where the demand collapses
because of an economic downturn, and local citizens turn against migrants and
want them expelled. If the good condition occurs, then granting rights to
remain is relatively cheap for the state. Although it might prefer to remove the
noncitizen to satisfy some passing political demand—perhaps reflecting
temporary changes in public sentiment or institutional spasms or occasional
opportunistic desires to extract revenues from them—the political benefits
from such removal are likely to be minimal and hence the cost of the right to
remain is low. But if the bad condition occurs, then granting rights to remain
is highly costly. The state cannot satisfy popular demand to expel the
migrants, and there will be political as well as financial costs from respecting
the right to remain.
Clearly, the state has little reason to grant the right to remain to the
seasonal migrants described above. Those seasonable migrants do not value
the right to remain very much because they do not intend to remain for long
periods and are much less likely to make country-specific investments. To put
this point more precisely, the joint value of the migration for the migrants
themselves and the host state is not maximized from a country-specific
investment on the part of the migrants. Accordingly, the state does not need
to grant the right to remain in order to secure the desired level of entry and
investment.
Suppose, however, that a state seeks migrants who will settle permanently.
The state might seek unskilled people or it might seek skilled people; for
present purposes, the distinction is unimportant. What is important is that
migrants who plan to settle permanently in the host state will need to learn the
language and make other country-specific investments. More precisely, a
migrant will obtain the highest return from settling in the country permanently
if she first makes a country-specific investment in language and other local
skills and continues to make country-specific investments once she arrives.
Since she can obtain the return on the country-specific investment only if she
can remain in the host country for as long as she wants, she will want more
than basic rights: she will want the right to remain.
The problem for the state is that if it grants migrants the right to remain,
it will not be able to remove them if circumstances change and the bad
condition occurs. So the state will grant migrants the right to remain only if
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the expected cost of that right is less than the benefit to the state. The migrant
might well prefer an absolute right to remain—that is, a right that prevails in
the bad as well as in the good condition. But if the states can credibly promise
to remove the migrant only in the bad condition, many people will still migrate
and make country-specific investments—just as long as the bad condition is
sufficiently unlikely, such as a major war or catastrophe.
Remember that migrants care about their environment, not just their right
to reside in the host state. Basic rights can protect some aspects of their lives,
but participation rights give them a way to affect the future bundle of public
goods supplied by the government. Thus, participation rights are an important
way migrants can improve their well-being in the host country. For the host
state, however, participation rights may enable migrants to influence public
policy in a manner that hurts the interests of citizens. Suppose, for example,
that citizens have a strong preference for maintaining high-quality public parks.
A class of migrants cares less about parks and more about the quality of the
roads. If migrants have participation rights, then they could cause the
government to reduce spending on parks and increase spending on roads. Ex
ante, citizens will prefer their state not to grant participation rights to migrants,
so as to maintain complete control over public policy.
The state will make the same cost-benefit calculation as it did before. If
more migrants will enter and make optimal country-specific investments if
they receive participation rights, such that the gains for citizens (in the form of
lower taxes, cheaper goods, and so forth) are greater than the costs for citizens
(in the form of congestion and public policy biased against them), then the
state will grant participation rights to noncitizens. There is a further
consideration here, however. Granting participation rights to migrants may be
less costly to citizens, the closer the migrants’ political preferences are to those
of citizens. Thus, a state may be more willing to grant participation rights, as
opposed to merely rights to remain, when the expected migration will consist
of people very much like citizens. However, by the same token, those
migrants may also value participation rights less because they do not fear that
that people similar to themselves will vote for policies they dislike.54
As an aside, note that states will not be likely to “bribe” people to migrate
by offering them significant cash payments. Such cash payments will not
encourage people to make country-specific investments unless the payments
are conditioned on those investments, which is likely to be impractical.
Instead, states offer people legal rights that protect the value of their labor and
other aspects of their lives, which should encourage people to make optimal
In Part III we relax this constraint, considering different ways in which participation rights
might impose costs on, or in some cases bring benefits to, the host state.
54
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country-specific benefits, as long as the state can keep its commitment not to
renege on the rights guarantees or otherwise reduce the migrant’s payoff.
C. The Optimal Content of Migrant Rights
To evaluate policy choices, we imagine two agents, a migrant and the
state. At time 0, the migrant enters the state and has an initial choice to make
a country-specific investment or not. The investment is costly, but has
positive net present value for the migrant as long as she is permitted to stay for
a sufficient length of time, during which she can recover the cost by working
and earning a wage. (We focus here on financial costs for expository
simplicity; but the model can encompass all sorts of nonmonetary costs and
benefits.) The migrant earns a higher wage if she invests than if she does not
invest. At the same time, the state benefits from the migrant’s presence
because she reduces labor costs and pays taxes.
At time 1, events change. Normally, the state has no reason to expel
migrants or change the living conditions of migrants, but let us put this normal
condition aside for expository clarity. Let’s define the good condition as one
in which the state gains by removing migrants or subjecting them to harsher
conditions, but the gain is relatively low. The bad condition—a crisis, a war,
an economic downturn, an influx of refugees—is the same except the gain is
relatively high. The state gains from removing migrants in both conditions,
but gains much more in the bad condition.
We assume that from the state’s standpoint the optimal policy at time 0 is
one in which the migrant can be removed, or her living circumstances
worsened, if the bad condition occurs, but cannot be removed or otherwise
harmed if the good condition occurs. The reason is the state gains more from
time 0 taxes than it loses in time 1 if the good condition occurs, but the state
gains less from time 0 taxes than it loses in time 1 if the bad condition occurs.
Moreover, the migrant will enter and make a country-specific investment only
if she can recover that investment in time 1, and we suppose that she can, in
an expected sense, as long as she can stay in the good condition and the
probability of the good condition is high enough. Yet she knows that the state
will have an incentive to remove her or make her life worse even if the good
condition occurs. Thus, in order to encourage migration and investment, the
state must commit itself not to remove the migrant, and to maintain her
conditions, in the good condition but not in the bad condition.55
This is the classic problem of time inconsistency, first analyzed in the economics literature
by Finn Kydland & Edward Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal
Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1977).
55
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An optimal “contract” between the state and migrant would provide that
the state can remove the migrant if the bad condition prevails and not if the
good condition prevails. How might such a contract appear in practice?
History suggests two prominent types of bad conditions: war (and other
security alarms) and economic downturns. During wars, migrants (especially
those from the enemy state) may be suspected of disloyalty and even espionage
or sabotage.56 During economic downturns, native citizens might seek the
expulsion of migrant who compete for scarce jobs.57 The optimal contract
therefore might state that the migrant remains in the country unless a war or
economic downturn occurs.
In practice, we observe migrant contracts that contain the war condition
but not the economic downturn condition. Governments typically retain the
right to deport migrants if war breaks out with the country of which they are
nationals.58 Migrants probably understand these rules and indeed, as far as we
know, migration between traditional enemies is unusual. An important
exception is British migration to the United States during the first half of the
nineteenth century but this case is unusual, given the historic ties between the
two countries.
In contrast, it is considerably more rare for countries to reserve an explicit
right to deport migrants during economic downturns. Why is this? The
problem with such a rule is that economic downturns are hard to define—
harder to define than a war. If the law provided that governments can remove
migrants if an economic downturn occurs, migrants might fear that the
government will engineer economic numbers that reflect a downturn or seize
on weak evidence to rationalize expulsions. But if the law is more specific,
then the government might fear that it will exclude a genuine crisis that does
not meet the law’s definition. If governments reserved the right to deport
migrants during economic downturns, then migrants would not have the
security necessary to make country-specific investments and hence would not
migrate or migrate but not invest.59
States usually take another tack. Instead of reserving a right to deport
under specified economic conditions, governments divide migrants into classes
See STONE, supra note 50.
See MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA (2002).
58 See An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (1798).
59 Note that migrants’ uncertainty about the verification process stems both from the
difficulty of specifying a clear rule and the worry that the state will interpret any less-than-clear
rule it adopts in a self-interested fashion. Third-party verification organizations could in
theory be used to reduce the second concern, but we do not observe these in practice.
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and reserve discretionary rights with respect to one class and not with respect
to the other. In the most common arrangement, migrants have limited rights
for a period of years; stronger rights for another period of years; and then
maximal rights, those of citizens. For example, in the United States many
migrants enter with an H1-B visa, which allows them to work for a particular
employer but not for anyone else.60 The visa expires after three years but can
usually be renewed once.61 At the expiration of the second via, the migrant
may be able to become a lawful permanent resident.62 The LPR has the right
to change jobs and the (conditional) right to stay indefinitely, but not the right
to vote. After five years as an LPR, the migrant has the legal right to
naturalize, whereupon she obtains the right to vote and other privileges of
citizenship.63 Thus migrants often enter and belong to the first class with the
expectation that if they remain in the country for a certain amount of time they
will be able to transition to the higher classes.
From the perspective of our model, these tiered classifications reflect
several priorities. First, they reflect the government’s interest in different types
of migrants. Governments classify migrants according to how much the state
desires a particular class of migrants, how much the successful migration of a
particular class hinges on country-specific investments, and so on. Highly
desirable migrants are given more generous rights; less desirable migrants are
not. Migrants for whom country-specific investments are crucial are given
more robust rights to remain than migrants who value entrance regardless of
their ability to recoup any country-specific investment. But even highly
desirable migrants do not have the right to preserve the conditions under
which they enter; such a right would be much too costly. Occasionally states
do give migrants some control over the conditions of their lives by giving
them voting rights, as some American states did during the nineteenth century,
but in the United Sates today those rights do not come until naturalization.64
Second, the tiered classifications reflect an implicit compromise between
the two competing goals of encouraging entrance and country-specific

See INA § 214.
See INA § 214 (g)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(9)(iii)(A), (h)(15)(ii)(B).
62 See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 21, at 400, 437; cf. INA § 101(a)(15)(b) (exempting H1B visa holders from the general requirement that any recipient of a temporary visa have “a
residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning”); 8 C.F.R. §
214.2(h)(16)(i) (permitting H-1B nonimmigrants from entering on the visa and simultaneously
seeking to become a permanent resident).
63 See INA § 316.
64 See supra text accompanying notes 40–45.
60
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investment, on the one hand, and government flexibility, on the other hand.65
During an economic downturn, the government can expel short-term
migrants, or refuse to renew their visas, thus relieving some of the political
pressure from native workers, while allowing long-term migrants to stay, thus
encouraging some degree of country-specific investment for future migrants.
The legal rights relating to transition are consistent with this compromise. In
the United States, for example, migrants have no formal right to transition
from their status as a temporary worker—say, on an H1-B visa—to the status
of lawful permanent resident.66 This lowers the cost to the government of
deciding during an economic downturn to cut off these migrants’ access to
LPR status. (In fact, during the current financial crisis there have been calls in
Congress for significant restrictions on the H1-B visa program.67) In contrast,
the government lacks legal discretion to deny naturalization to lawful
permanent residents who satisfy the residency requirement and a few others.68
A further point is that even in the bad condition, migrants enjoy basic
rights—for example, they may keep their property. Thus, from an ex ante
perspective, migrants expect to retain at least some of their gains even if not all
of their expected gains. This compromise reflects the fact that governments
care most about eliminating security threats or labor unrest in the bad
condition, and can probably obtain little value by confiscating migrants’
property when the latter can remit money to relatives overseas and in most
cases do not accumulate much in the first place. Basic property rights in the
bad condition give the migrants at least some incentive to make country-

65 An additional possibility relates to immigrant screening. An interesting feature of this
progressive accumulation of rights is that the migrant has a weaker incentive to make countryspecific investments initially, but the incentive strengthens over time. Correlatively, the
receiving country’s flexibility decreases over time. One plausible explanation for this
arrangement is that the receiving country obtains better information about the migrant over
time. It is optimal for the country to have flexibility when little is known about the migrant;
the country can cede flexibility as it becomes increasingly clear that the migrant poses no
threat and has integrated effectively. See Cox & Posner, supra note 8.
66 See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 21, at 437 (discussing the formal legal distinction
between nonimmigrants and immigrants and describing the way in which the immigration
system has come in recent years to treat nonimmigrants admissions more like the transition
model described above than like an entirely separate track).
67 See Laura Crimaldi, Walls Closing on All Sides for Immigrants: Economic Crisis, Crackdown Hit
Community Hard, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 22, 2009, at A6; Editorial, Immigration Crackdown Written Into
The New Stimulus Law Will Damage New York’s Financial Sector, DAILY NEWS, Feb. 23, 2009.
68 See INA §§ 311–331. Whether naturalization is discretionary or as a matter of right is an
important design decision about which the United States has long taken a quite different
approach than most of western Europe.
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specific investments, while giving the government flexibility where it most
needs it.
The model suggests other ways in which the optimal migrant contract
could be designed. Suppose, for example, that the receiving country retains a
right to expel the migrant only upon payment of some large sum to the
migrant. The migrant might be willing to make the country-specific
investment knowing that even if she can be expelled, she will be compensated
to a degree for her investment.69 The country retains flexibility and, if the
demand for entry is high enough, could even offset the cost by requiring the
migrant to pay fees upon entry. Such a system would approximate an
insurance scheme, where migrants in essence purchase insurance policies upon
entry—policies that pay out if the bad condition occurs and the migrants are
required to leave.
We do not observe such a system, though close variations have recently
cropped up. Spain, which absorbed large numbers of low-skilled migrants
during a decade-long economic boom, has recently begun offering those
migrants cash if they leave the country.70 While the cash-for-leaving policy is
structured as an option rather than a requirement, it reflects the basic logic:
Spain can remove migrants today while setting a precedent that encourages
future migrants to make country-specific investments when the economy
recovers.71 This also suggests an additional wrinkle on our earlier discussion of
precommitment. Spain may have been legally authorized to revoke these
migrants’ work visas, but doing so might have made future migrants more
wary about immigrating to Spain or investing after they arrived. To the extent

69 Options play an important role in the design of optimal contracts; see, for example,
BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 7.
70 See Christine Spolar, Spain Tries to Buy Out Immigrants, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 13, 2008,
at 7; see also Czech Republic to Pay Unemployed Foreign Workers to Go Home, REUTERS, Feb. 9, 2009,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5185Y920090209 (offering
to pay plane fair for foreign workers unable to pay for their own return).
71 The Spanish policy is also likely driven by the fiscal consequences of the low-skilled
migrants. Over the last decade, Spain has frequently regularized the status of irregular workers
and extended the social safety net to cover large numbers of immigrant workers, in part to
encourage their integration. As Spain’s economy soured, however, these migrants’ eligibility
for public assistance increased the state’s fiscal burden. Spain then offered many of the
migrants lump-sum payments of a fraction of their unemployment benefits in exchange for
promises that the migrants would leave the country and not return for at least three years. See
Spolar, supra note 70.
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that a state’s reputation for visa compliance affects the decisions of future
migrants, its reputation can also play a role in promoting precommitment.72
Finally, states may try to compromise their need for flexibility and the
migrant’s interest in security by granting voting rights to migrants. Voting
rights give migrants the power to form coalitions that can block adverse
legislation but, as long as migrants remain in the minority, not enough power
to block adverse legislation that is overwhelmingly in the interest of natives. If
natives cannot from powerful anti-migrant coalitions in the good condition,
but can in the bad condition, then voting rights may have the same effect as
the optimal contract.73
The arrangements we have discussed are vulnerable to shifts in the
underlying variables. Consider first our claim that a war is more easily
verifiable than an economic downturn. This may well be true in general but
there are telling exceptions. The conflict with Islamic extremists falls
somewhere between a true war and a law enforcement operation. In the wake
of 9/11, the U.S. government did not expel large numbers of migrants from
Arab and Muslim lands with heavy Al Qaida presence but it did subject these
migrants to intrusive monitoring programs.74 These programs may well have
seemed to Arabs and Muslims a breach of the implicit migration contract; for
the U.S. government, a change in circumstances justified a change in the law.
However one looks at it, migrants from the relevant countries will be more
reluctant to enter the United States and to make country-specific
investments.75 The U.S. government response has introduced uncertainty,
which makes the war condition more like the economic downturn condition,
possibly leading to an outcome where few or no migrants enter and invest.
To sum up, the optimal contract will provide that the government may
deport migrants if bad conditions occur, but if the bad condition is
unverifiable, then the government may retain discretion to remove the migrant
or alter conditions or the government loses that discretion or the bulk of it.
We observe the intermediate solution most vividly in war-related government
rights; otherwise, governments tend to divide people in classes that enjoy little
See Eric A. Posner & Jack L. Goldsmith, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 4
(2005); Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L LAW J. (forthcoming
2009).
73 We discuss this argument in more detail in Parts II.D. and III.C.
74 See sources cited supra note 1.
75 Indeed, there are anecdotal accounts of Muslim immigrants choosing other destination
states, like Canada, over the United States because of this uncertainty. See Interview with
Ahilan Arulanantham, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California (Februrary
2009).
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protection or a great deal of protection. As a result, many migrants do not
make country-specific investments; others do, either because they receive
protection immediately or they are willing to risk removal during the first
period in the hope of obtaining protection starting in the second period.
When the underlying variables change, so should the law, and here we can
offer some rough predictions. If the technology for verifying conditions
change so that verification becomes difficult, then governments will choose an
extreme outcome—our Al Qaida example. If the risk of the bad condition
increases, then migrants’ rights should become weaker. And if the value of
country-specific investments increases—as might happen, as a country moves
from an agricultural or traditional market economy to a “knowledge-based”
economy—then migrants’ rights should become stronger.
D. The Optimal Strength of Migrant Rights
The optimal contracting problem has an additional dimension not present
in ordinary contractual relations, where it can be assumed that courts will
enforce the contracts to which parties agree. Even if it were possible to
describe precisely the good and bad states of the world, prospective migrants
may worry that the state will renege on its obligations under the agreement.
The state might retroactively change deportation policy in a way that makes
many noncitizens removable even in the good state of the world. Or, short of
deportation, the state might harass the migrants or otherwise make their lives
miserable, akin to constructive firing in the employment setting. This raises
the problem of the strength of rights, or, more precisely, their degree of
entrenchment.
Consider the difference between statutory and constitutional rights. If
migrants are given an absolute right to stay and this right is statutory, then the
state can eliminate this right merely by changing the law. Now, in fact, it
might be difficult to change the law, in which case the right is robust. But it
might also be easy to change the law. Alternatively, the right could be
constitutional. If the right is constitutional, it can still be changed, but doing
so will be more difficult. It should be clear that generous rights (such as an
absolute right to stay) that are weakly entrenched may offer less protection
than weaker rights (such as a right to stay unless there is a war) that are more
strongly entrenched.
The three main source of rights can be arranged from weakest to
strongest. Repeal of administrative rights can occur at the behest of the
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executive alone.76 Repeal of statutory rights requires the participation of
Congress. Repeal of constitutional rights requires the satisfaction of various
supermajority rules or the acquiescence of the courts.77 All else equal, entry
and country-specific investment will be greater when rights are more highly
entrenched than when they are not. By the same token, the flexibility of the
state is reduced. If it fails to anticipate a crisis or type of crisis, and thus does
not incorporate an option to remove into the basic legal scheme, it will not be
able to add such an option if the right to remain is sufficiently entrenched.
Now consider a third possibility: giving the migrant the right to vote. The
right to vote is distinctive. Like the right to stay, it can (in principle) be
statutory or constitutional, and thus can be more or less easy for other (citizen)
voters to eliminate. Yet the migrant herself can exercise her right to vote and
use it to elect officeholders who will support the migrant’s rights. So the right
to vote is, to a degree, self-entrenching. To be sure, it is worth little by itself;
but if there is a critical mass of migrants, the right to vote can be quite
powerful. Thus, unlike the right to stay, the value of the right to vote is a
function of how many other migrants have that right, and how native citizens
are likely to exercise their own votes. If few other migrants exist or few have
votes, or if citizens make up a large majority and vote in blocs, then a migrant
is not likely to value the right to vote. But in many cases, migrants will be able
to form blocs and then make coalitions with other groups of citizens.78 This
will allow them to protect whatever interests they value the most. This shows
that participation rights can have distinctive value as a mechanism for
overcoming immigration law’s precommitment problem.
How might states choose among these options? Our starting point—that
many migrants gain from making country-specific investments but states want
to be able to remove migrants in the bad condition—entails that some level of
security less than absolute will prevail. Let’s assume a baseline where the state
simply exercises administrative discretion and can retain or remove migrants at
will. Migrants might fear that the executive will remove them for political
reasons even when the bad condition does not occur, and thus refrain from
investing. How might a state improve on this outcome?
− First, a state might pass a statute that provides for fully secure rights. If
migrants expect judges to interpret the statute fairly, and if the legislature
can repeal the statute only with great difficult—for example, only if an
emergency (the bad condition) exists—then the statute might be an
See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law
(unpublished manuscript 2009).
77 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
78 See infra text accompanying notes 94–108.
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adequate solution. However, the legislature itself might be no less
trustworthy than the executive.
− Second, a state might constitutionalize the statute, thus eliminating the
ability of the legislature to overturn it. A state will do this if it expects that
it can amend the constitution in an emergency or (what is more likely) that
courts will fairly carve out exceptions for emergencies. Migrants would
also need to trust the courts.
− Third, a state might instead grant the migrant voting rights, thus giving her
the ability to block self-serving interpretations by the government or
statutory revisions by the legislature. As we noted above, a state will most
likely grant voting rights to migrants who share the basic values and
preferences of existing citizens. Migrants will be most likely to value these
rights if they believe they can form a coalition that is large enough to
protect their interests.
It should be clear, then, that states can commit themselves in two ways,
substantively and procedurally. If a law can reflect the optimal contract—that
is, removal only in the bad condition—then it is optimal if it cannot
practicably be changed but not if it can too easily be changed. If the law gives
migrants blanket protections but can be changed with difficulty—and only, in
practice, when the bad condition prevails—then such a law can be optimal as
well. In the United States, the rights of long-term migrants have, over the
centuries, become to a limited extent constitutionalized.
Yet these
constitutional rights remain minimal and mostly procedural rather than
substantive. For example, Congress is free to pass statutes requiring the
deportation of long term residents on almost any basis—and to apply the new
deportation rules retroactively.79 At the same time, the executive has gained
increasing control over the rights of migrants, especially in the form of
enforcement actions against migrants who have entered illegally.80 Thus, the
strength of rights varies according to the type of migrant and the type of right
in question, and, as we expect from our theory, the rights of short-term
migrants are weakest, that is, easiest to change.
To sum up, migration policy presents a precommitment problem for the
state. The state seeks to encourage migrants to enter and make countryspecific investments so that it can obtain greater tax revenues and other
See Galvan v. Press 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (upholding the retroactive application of the
Subversive Activity Control Act); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); see also
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009 (making many retroactive changes to the grounds of deportability); INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289 (2001) (discussing IIRIRA’s retroactive application).
80 See Cox & Posner, supra note 8.
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benefits. At the same time, the state has a strong interest in being able to
remove migrants, or significantly reduce their living circumstances, ex post. If
the content of rights could be perfectly specified in advance—so that the state
can take adverse actions against migrants if and only if doing is socially optimal
for citizens from an ex ante perspective—then the rights should be the
strongest possible. But because the rights cannot be perfectly specified in
advance, the states faces a second-order tradeoff between granting weak rights
(so that the state can change them at will but with the result that migrants will
be reluctant to invest) and strong rights (so that migrants can invest but the
state will not be able to change them when doing so is optimal).
We can again offer some predictions. When verification costs are low and
so states can offer state-contingent contracts, the strength of rights should be
high. When verification costs are high, then states will offer stronger rights
(for example, statutory rather than administrative) to migrants who optimally
make country-specific investments than to migrants who do not. In the
United States, skilled workers who enter on visas have statutory rights;
unskilled workers who enter illegally have quasi-administrative rights, that is,
they remain on the sufferance of the executive.81
III. COMPLICATIONS
We have offered a very simple model with potentially testable predictions.
The real world is more complex, however, and here we suggest some ways for
complicating the analysis.
A. Exit Rights
All migrants have the right to exit. In our setup, this right is irrelevant,
because the problem on which we focus is that of the self-commitment of the
receiving country. But one can imagine the opposite problem, namely, that
countries fear that if they welcome migrants and incur costs in training,
educating, and assimilating them (for example, bilingual programs in schools),
the migrants will leave the country before working and paying enough taxes
that the country recovers its investment.
If this problem is real, receiving countries could deny migrants the right to
exit, or require migrants to post a bond before they enter, which they lose if
they voluntarily leave the country before a specified period of time has expired.
In practice no modern democracy formally limits migrants’ (or citizens’) exit
See Cox & Posner, supra (discussing the de fact low-rights system of illegal entry); Cox &
Rodriguez (working paper).
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rights, and we do not observe the bonding system. This suggests that the
problem is theoretical rather than real. Nonetheless, some countries do
require migrants to repudiate their citizenship in other countries before
accepting citizenship in receiving countries.82 This requirement reduces the
value of the exit option, as the exiting migrant would need to reapply for
citizenship in her native country or go elsewhere. We will discuss dual
citizenship in greater detail in Part V.B.
If migrants have the right to exit, the value of that exit right varies greatly.
Migrants from high-wage countries have more valuable exit rights than
migrants from low-wage countries; the latter lose more future income if they
leave the receiving country. Refugees also have high exit costs: if they return
to their native country, they may be harassed or killed. One might predict that
receiving countries would offer weaker rights to migrants with low-value exit
options: the receiving country need not fear that migrants will leave if they are
treated poorly for political reasons, and thus can depend on them making
country-specific investments. One observes this pattern of regulation in the
United States, where high-skilled workers from prosperous nations in Europe
and elsewhere are often accorded substantial legal rights, while low-skilled
workers from much poorer nations in Central and South America are admitted
on very restrictive terms or permitted to enter without any legal status at all.83
B. Families
Our basic theory assumed just two agents—a monolithic state and a
solitary migrant. But migrants are seldom solitary. States can encourage
migrants to enter and invest by promising rights to family members and
relatives such as children. As before, however, the state risks tying its hands in
a way that may hurt it ex post.
Sending and Receiving States face similar choices with respect to the
treatment of children and other family members. A migrant may have any
number of family relationships, current (as of the time of migration) and
prospective (after migration). Let us distinguish a few dimensions. First, at
the time of arrival she may have many or few relatives, and these may be close
or distant. Second, she may bring these relatives (some or all) with her or they
See Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws, in
CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 17 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff &
Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2001); Simone Tan, Note, Dual Nationality in France and the United
States, 15 HASTINGS INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 447, 461–462 (1992).
83 See Cox & Posner, supra note 8 (describing this pattern). Refugees are an exception in the
United States. They are formally provided generous rights, including legal status and the right
to eventually become lawful permanent residents. See INA §§ 208, 209.
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may stay in the Sending State. Third, she may establish new family
relationships in the Receiving State—in particular, a spouse and children (but
also in-laws, nephews, nieces, and so forth). Fourth, her new relations may
have stronger or weaker connections with the Receiving State (they might be
noncitizens, for example). The Sending and Receiving States must make
numerous choices about how to treat these relations and therefore the migrant
herself, given that the migrant will care about maintaining these relationships
and (usually) staying in proximity with her relations.
We can speak broadly of favorable family policies or unfavorable family
policies, where the degree of favor refers to the extent to which the migrant
may exercise an option to enter with pre-entry family connections and to exit
with post-entry family connections. To keep things simple, however, let us
focus on perhaps the most important issue from the standpoint of policy: the
rights of children.
Consider a migrant who enters the Receiving State and then has a child
while on that country’s territory. The basic conceptual divide is between jus
sanguinis and jus soli.84 Jus sanguinis provides that the child derives her
citizenship from her parents: so a child of German citizens who is born in the
United States has German citizenship.85 Jus soli provides that the child derives
her citizenship from the state on whose territory she is born.86 So the child in
our example would have United States citizenship. Actual laws deviate from
these paradigms, and various rules resolve conflicts or permit dual
citizenship.87 But we will limit ourselves to the paradigm cases.
What are the costs and benefits of the two systems? For the migrant, a
host country with jus soli is more attractive than a country with jus sanguinis
because only in the first country can her child, if born in the Receiving State,
have Receiving State citizenship. Given that a child who is born and spends
several years in the Receiving State will be a native speaker of that language,
and may have trouble learning the language of the Sending State, the migrant’s
interest in obtaining citizenship for her child may be very strong. To be sure,
this citizenship might not be worth anything if she leaves.88 But, compared to
jus sanguinis, jus soli gives the migrant the option to obtain citizenship for her
See Weil, supra note 82.
See RUTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 31–
33 (1994).
86 See id.
87 We discuss the variations in citizenship rules more fully in Part IV.B.
88 In theory, the children’s citizenship in the Receiving State may be limited by Sending State
rules. In practice, however, this is seldom true.
84
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child if she decides to remain permanently in the Receiving State, so her child,
as an adult, may stay as well.
At the same time, the migrant will also prefer the system of jus sanguinis
in the Sending State. This ensures that if she decides to return, then her child
will be able to return with her and reside permanently as a citizen.89
Consider now the Receiving State’s perspective. With respect to
immigrants, it encourages immigration and country-specific investment by
adopting jus soli. Immigrants are more likely to enter, and to invest in
country-specific assets, if they expect children whom they bear in the
Receiving State to become citizens. There is some evidence that the United
States adopted a jus soli regime in part for these reasons; it was a fledgling
nation with vast tracts of land and a strong interest in attracting labor.90
The cost of jus soli is that these children will have voting rights. Now,
often this cost is very low. The children of immigrants often easily learn the
language of the Receiving State and adopt the values and absorb the culture of
the people who live there. However, in countries where assimilation is
difficult, the cost could be very high. The Receiving State might fear that
descendents of migrants will form an unassimilated and hostile group; and if
the group has voting power, it may distort political outcomes away from what
is preferred by native citizens and their descendents. If the Receiving State
fears such an effect, it will prefer jus sanguinis, even though jus sanguinis will
deter migration. Indeed, if jus sanguinis laws do not deter migration, they can
create a self-fulfilling prophecy, as migrants teach their children the Sending
State language so that the children will have a viable exit option, in which case
these children may not learn the Receiving State language well enough for
assimilation. It may not be a coincidence that jus soli prevails in the United
States, with its successful history of assimilation, and jus sanguinis has
historically in European countries such as Germany and France, which have
unassimilated national minorities—but the direction of causality is unclear.91
This point applies with diminishing force as generations pass. The migrant probably
thinks very little about the rights of her great- or great-great-grand children. Many states—
including the United States—have a generational cutoff. See INA § 301. But a state is less
likely to have such a cut-off if it identifies strongly as a diaspora nation founded on a shared
ethnic or religious identity. Such states will want to extend citizenship even to the remote
descendants of citizens in order to encourage their entry. In that light it is unsurprising that
Israel permits distant descendants to enter the country and quickly become Israeli citizens. See
Yousef T. Jabareen, Constitution Building and Equality in Deeply-Divided Societies: The Case of the
Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 26 WISC. INT’L. L. J. 345, 368–69 (2008).
90 Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of International Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1984).
91 See Weil, supra note 82, at 17 (describing this historical pattern).
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The Sending State can choose to benefit the emigrant by creating a system
of jus sanguinis. If jus soli prevails, the emigrant’s foreign-born children will
not have Sending State citizenship. This lowers the value of the emigrant’s
option to exit the Sending State. By contrast, if jus sanguinis prevails in the
Sending State, the emigrant can be sure that her children will be citizens in that
state. Thus, the Sending State might use a system of jus sanguinis to
encourage out-migration, and jus soli to discourage out-migration.
However, it should be clear that states need not have the same system for
emigrants and immigrants. A country that seeks to encourage immigration and
emigration, for example, might have jus soli for immigrants and jus sanguinis
for emigrants. This is, in fact, close to the practical effect of United States
citizenship policy, which combines elements of both jus soli and jus
sanguinis.92 Various rules can also be used to soften the edges of the paradigm
regimes. A jus soli state, for example, might allow a returning migrant to
obtain citizenship status for children born overseas, with greater or lesser
hurdles, such as waiting periods, fees, and so forth. And, indeed, since World
War II countries with different migration law traditions have been gradually
converging toward a system that combines elements of jus soli and jus
sanguinis.93
Our point, for now, is that what one might call child-citizenship rights—
jus soli, jus sanguinis, and the variations—are similar to basic rights,
participation rights, and the right to stay, but with an additional twist. Like the
other rights, they are used by the Receiving State to attract migrants and
encourage investment, and will be particularly attractive for the Receiving State
when assimilation can be expected. The twist is that child-citizenship rights
can also be used by the Sending State to increase or reduce the value of the
exit option of citizens in foreign states.
C. Voting Rights
Our simple model above assumed that the cost of political participation
by migrants stemmed exclusively from their potentially divergent preferences.
The truth is more complicated. From the Receiving State’s perspective, there
are several different reasons why it might be costly to extend voting rights to
migrants.
Consider first the problems of information and inculcation. The
Receiving State might worry that voters need certain information to cast
intelligent ballots; without that information voters might vote in ways that are
92
93

See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 21, at 15–55.
See Weil, supra note 82, at 25–32 (describing recent convergence of laws).
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detrimental to the state and perhaps themselves. The concern is that new
immigrants do not have sufficient information. The inculcation issue is
related: the state might worry that new immigrants will vote in ways
detrimental to the existing polity because they will initially not have absorbed
the values of the existing community. Both of these concerns track parallel
arguments in American voting rights jurisprudence. As recently as the 1960s
several states (and some local governments) had durational residency
requirements for voting.94 New residents were ineligible to vote until they had
resided in the state for a fixed period—sometimes up to one year. When these
laws were challenged in court, the states defended them on information and
inculcation grounds. These arguments were squarely rejected by the Supreme
Court.95 But the Court did not reject the arguments as implausible; rather it
concluded as a normative matter that these were impermissible concerns
where inter-local or interstate (rather than international) migration was at
stake.96
The informational and inculcation issues are both transitional concerns.
They suggest that the cost of conferring political rights on migrants might
decline over time. If these were the only costs, they could be alleviated
through durational residency requirements—such as the current five year
residency requirement prior to naturalization—or by other mechanisms
designed to lower information costs or reshape migrants’ preferences.
But even if migrants all have good information and fixed preferences, the
Receiving State might worry that those preferences diverge from the existing
polity in a way that imposes costs on the state. Importantly, however, this
does not mean that the Receiving State need always strive to pick migrants
with political preferences close to those of existing citizens, as is sometimes
assumed by commentators.
If politics is driven by the median voter, for example, then the state need
only ensure that extending voting rights to migrants doesn’t move the median.
The Receiving State could accomplish this in one of two ways. First it could
grant voting rights only to migrants whose preferences are quite close to the
existing median voter. Second it could extend the franchise to migrants with
diverse preferences, so long as it ensured that these voters’ preferences were
94 See, e.g., Tenn. Const. art. IV, § 1 (1970) (“Every person of the age of twenty-one years,
being a citizen of the United States, and a resident of this State for twelve months, and of the
county wherein such person may offer to vote for three months, next preceding the day of
election, shall be entitled to vote for . . . members of the General Assembly and other civil
officers for the county or district in which such person resides . . . .”).
95 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
96 See Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330.
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distributed around the same median as the existing polity. On this account,
the cost of migrant voting is a function of the median migrant’s preferences
but not of the diversity of migrants’ views.97 Homogeneity itself is relatively
unimportant -- and could actually be quite costly if the Receiving State picks a
homogenous group of migrants but misjudges their preferences.98
Relatedly, it is not just migrant voters’ preferences that will concern the
Receiving States. Governments are powerful agents of redistribution. This
raises the concern that migrants—even migrants who have ideological
preferences identical to existing citizens—might try to use their political power
to redistribute the state’s wealth to themselves. If this is the state’s central
concern, then it will worry much more about the organizational capacities of
the immigrant pool rather than their ideological distribution. Migrants who
can more easily overcome collective action problems and band together as a
group will be more likely to engage in successful rent seeking.99 Shared
cultural, ethnic, or linguistic identity might be one feature that facilitates such
collective action—consider, for example, the Cuban immigrant community,
whose political power has been widely documented.100 Thus, a state concerned
most about rent seeking might try to limit large scale migrations from a single
source, to pick migrants with diverse ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, and so
forth.101
97 As a technical matter, the cost is also a function of the size of the migrant pool. If the
median migrant’s preferences diverge from the existing electorate, the extent to which this will
actually shift the receiving state’s policies depends on the relative size of the existing polity and
the pool of potential migrant voters.
98 There are other theories on which the Receiving State might favor homogeneity in the
electorate. Governments produce public goods. A trope of local government literature is that
the efficiency of public good production can be improved by increasing the homogeneity of
the electorate. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956). This can be true where there are economies of scale associated with public
goods, or where supplying one public good interferes with the supply of another (this could be
true because the goods themselves are in conflict, as with open spaces and highways, or
because the production of public goods is costly and the government is fiscally constrained).
If the efficient supply of public goods were all one cared about, then one would want to use
immigration law to increase the homogeneity of the electorate. While this might be a plausible
account for very small states, it seems relatively implausible for a large and quite diverse state
like the United States.
99 See MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).
100 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L. J. 869 (1995).
101 The United States quota system includes some such limits. Per-country caps limit the
number of migrants from sending state who may receive visas. For most states these
restrictions are irrelevant, but they impose tremendous restrictions on migration from places
like Mexico and the Philippines. See INA § 202 (setting per-country caps); see also ALEINIKOFF
ET AL., supra note 21, at 308–11 (describing the per-country caps and the effect they have on
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As should be clear from the examples, different theories about the
structure and function of democracy lead to quite different, often conflicting
prescriptions. For example, a government concerned about producing public
goods efficiently might favor a homogenous migrant pool; but a homogenous
pool of migrants is the last thing a government concerned about rent seeking
would want. Moreover, understanding more fully the political implications of
immigration policy highlights a potential tension in a state’s immigrantselection system. States select immigrants along several dimensions. One
important dimension is the labor market dimension: states often choose
immigrants who promote particular labor market goals. In the United States
today, this might mean admitting a large number of low-skilled workers. But
the state’s selection preferences regarding the labor market might conflict with
the state’s ideological selection preferences.102 Low skilled workers might turn
out to have ideological preferences far from that of the existing electorate.
Where this is true the state must make a trade-off: it must either compromise
along one of these dimensions or attempt to avoid the compromise by
admitting the immigrants while excluding them from participation in the
political process.103
This trade-off might help explain why the United States today is
contemplating the use of temporary migration programs (which really means a
quite slow path to permanent residence and eventual voting) for low-skilled
workers but a much quicker path for high-skilled workers.
The
comprehensive reform legislation that failed to make it out of Congress in
2006 reflected this structure.104 Several versions of that legislation combined a
large increase in the green-card quota for high-skilled workers with the
creation of a large-scale temporary worker program for low-skilled workers.105
The high skilled workers given green cards and admitted to lawful permanent
residence would have been eligible to naturalize in five years.106 In contrast,
China, India, Mexico, and the Philippines); Department of State, Visa Bulletin, No. 4, Vol. IX
(January 2009) (showing current backlogs that the caps create).
102 See Francesc Ortega, Immigration Quotas and Skill Upgrading, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1841 (2004).
103 This also suggests that, on the margin, states will be more likely to try to attract
ideologically dissimilar immigrants with other forms of security—such as security from
deportation.
104 See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (passed by
the Senate on May 25, 2006).
105 See id. tit. V (raising employment quota that goes mostly to high-skilled workers from
150,000 per year to 450,000 per year and altering the diversity lottery in some ways to promote
the entry of even more high skilled LPRs); id. tit. IV (establishing H-2C temporary worker
program for low-skilled workers).
106 See INA § 316.
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the low-skilled workers would have had to work for at least four years (and
typically longer) before becoming eligible to apply for lawful permanent
residency—and their applications would be further delayed if they were unable
to pass English and civics exams from which the high-skilled migrants were
exempt.107 This would mean that low-skilled workers would have to wait
nearly twice as long as high-skilled workers (under the best of circumstances)
to obtain political rights. One account of this differential treatment is that the
government believed that high-skilled workers are more likely—because of
their countries of origin, their high levels of education, etc.—to have
ideological preferences closer to those of the existing electorate in the United
States.
The European Union presents another interesting example. Article 19 of
the EC Treaty gives every citizen of the EU the right to vote in municipal
elections wherever she is a resident.108 A Pole living in Paris can thus vote in
Paris’s mayoral elections; she cannot vote in French parliamentary or
presidential elections. The rules clearly reflect the goal of European
integration—to strengthen incentives for workers to move to places where
their labor is most highly valued. They increase the incentive to make countryspecific investments by giving migrants the ability to form political coalitions
that block policies that harm them. At the same, time the rules implicitly
recognize that foreigners do not share all of the values and interests of
nationals, and hence limit the ability of foreigners to affect policy by depriving
them of the vote at the national level.
D. The Role of Employers
As noted above, many U.S. employment visas permit the migrant to enter
only with the sponsorship of the employer. The migrant can remain in the
country only as long as she continues to work for that employer.109 This
feature of the law gives the employer a great deal of bargaining power, and
makes the migrant vulnerable to hold-up and other forms of opportunism.110
107 See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 tit. VI (providing eventual path to
LPR status, through self-petition or through existing visa applications).
108 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 18.
109 See INA §§ 247(a). Some employment visas permit migrants to change jobs but make it
cumbersome to do so, thereby limiting labor market mobility as a practical matter. See, e.g.,
INA § 214(n) (H-1B portability provision).
110 See NGAI, supra note 57 (criticizing the Bracero program on these grounds); CINDY
HAHAMOVITCH, THE FRUITS OF THEIR LABOR: ATLANTIC COAST FARMWORKERS AND THE
MAKING OF MIGRANT POVERTY, 1870–1945 (1997); Levins, Congressional Research Service,
Programs Funded by the H-1B Visa Education and Training Fee (2007).
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As a consequence, the migrant will make employer-specific investments
rather than country-specific investments at the margin. The reason is that the
migrant can recover the costs of her investments only by remaining with the
employer. From the perspective of the receiving country, this arrangement
may not be ideal. The receiving country does better from country-specific
investments than from employer-specific investments. However, employers
may gain from this arrangement—it increases their bargaining power with
respect to the migrant, which may enable them to recover the cost of luring
the migrant to the country and training her—and, from the perspective of the
receiving country, the difference between employer-specific investment and
country-specific investment may be slight.
A further consideration is that migrants may be hesitant about entering a
country and making country- and employer-specific investments if the
employer has so much bargaining power. The employer has a strong ex post
incentive to hold up the migrant, forcing her to choose between low wages
that do not cover her ex ante investments or to return to her native country
where her wages are even lower.111 To attract migrants who are hesitant for
these reasons, employers would need to establish a reputation for fair ex post
treatment or agree to contractual obligations along the same lines.
E. Internal Political Economy
Up to this point, we have assumed that the state is a monolithic entity that
steadfastly pursues the interests of its citizens. This oversimplification helps
highlight some important dynamics, but it obscures the internal political
economy of the state. Decisions about which immigrants to admit and
whether (or how quickly) to confer voting rights are themselves the product of
the existing political process.112
Perhaps the most important possibility is that insiders will use
immigration policy to try to lock themselves in power. They might attempt to
do this in several ways. First, they might do so by keeping out migrants with
111 Historically this has been a significant problem in the United States. See NGAI, supra note
57. Today it is often a principle objection to those who oppose the creation of larger
temporary worker programs, particularly for low-skilled workers. See Cristina M. Rodriguez,
Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another,
2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219 (2007).
112 In this sense there is a very important and overlooked parallel between immigration law
and the law of democracy: both contain a basic endogeneity because the legal rules regulate the
boundaries that determine who will participate in the setting of future legal rules. This
endogeneity is a central theme of modern voting rights scholarship. But it is largely ignored by
immigration scholars.
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different electoral preferences, or about whom there is more uncertainty about
their preferences. These migrants might be excluded at the border; or the state
might admit them but either deny them voting rights or delay their access to
the franchise. This could be accomplished by making migrants ineligible for
citizenship or by requiring a longer period of residence before the migrants are
eligible for citizenship. Second, this dynamic could also operate in reverse,
with political insiders encouraging immigration by potential supporters and
speeding their access to the franchise (by, for example, shortening the
naturalization period or granting voting rights prior to naturalization). A third
possibility is that political insiders would encourage out-migration by political
opponents, either by deporting them or by making their day-to-day lives much
less comfortable.
The third possibility seems quite unlikely in the United States. First,
voters in national elections today are all citizens, and the Constitution prohibits
the deportation of citizens.113 Second, the cost of exit from the nation is often
quite high, so it is hard to imagine the state successfully encouraging or
coercing voters to leave by making their lives more difficult. That said, there is
some evidence that this strategy has been used at the local level.114 And the
deportation provision in the 1798 Alien and Sedition Act suggests that the
possibility is not unheard of at the national level.115
The first possibility seems considerably more plausible. In fact, some
historical episodes in America are consistent with this explanation. Consider,
for example, the rapid changes made to U.S. naturalization rules in the period
immediately following the ratification of the Constitution. Over the course of
a few short years in the 1790s, Congress sharply expanded the durational
residency requirement for naturalization—from two years to five, and then
from five to fourteen years.116 These changes had the effect of keeping some
new migrants out of the voting booth for very lengthy periods of time by
delaying access to citizenship; and even in situations where citizenship was not
required for voting, it precluded office holding by migrants. Many historians
have argued that these early changes to naturalization law were in part the
See supra text accompanying note 15; See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
One prominent example is James Michael Curley, the Irish American mayor of Boston,
who over decades contributed to the dramatic depopulation of the city’s anglo protestant
citizens. See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Schleifer, The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the
Electorate, 21 J. L. & ECON. 1 (2005).
115 See Alien Enemies Act of 1798, U.S.C. §§ 21–24.
116 See Act of March 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (establishing requirement of two years residence
before naturalization); Act of January 29, 1795, 1 Stat. 414 (extending the required residency
period to five years); Act of June 18, 1798, 1 Stat. 556 (extending residency period to fourteen
years), repealed by Act of April 14, 1802, 2 Stat. 155 (returning residency period to five years).
113
114
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product of a fight between nascent American political parties—an attempt by
the emerging Federalist part to keep the government out of the hands of the
Republicans.117
Since the Alien and Sedition Act episode, the naturalization delay has
been formally stable in American immigration law. Lawful permanent
residents have for the last 200 years been required to live in the United States
for five years before becoming eligible to naturalize.118 Thus it is tempting to
conclude that durational residency requirements have not been used to shape
the composition of the electorate. But there are two important exceptions.
First, until well into the twentieth century immigrants from Asia were ineligible
to naturalize because of racial bias in the naturalization rules.119 Second, while
the formal residency rule has remained fixed, other changes to the immigration
law have created considerable variation in practice. Much of that variation is
the product of changes in who falls into the legal category of lawful permanent
resident. In the nineteenth century basically all immigrants fell into this
category. But the twentieth century brought the growth of two new groups:
temporary migrants who were entitled to enter for fixed periods of time, and
so-called illegal immigrants who were not legally entitled to reside in the
country.120 It might seem like a mistake to consider these migrants, as neither
is formally on the path to citizenship. But in practice both groups often are.
Modern immigration law sometimes offers temporary immigrants the option,
after some period of time, to become lawful permanent residents. For such
migrants, the effect of their initially “temporary” admission is simply to
lengthen the period of residence required before naturalization.121 Relatedly,
unauthorized migrants have sometimes been provided the opportunity
(through periodic legalizations, the INA’s cancellation of removal provisions,
etc.) to become lawful permanent residents and eventually citizens.122 But as a
See, e.g., SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2008).
See Act of April 14, 1802, 2 Stat. 155.
119 See Cox, supra note 1, at 404 (outlining racial restrictions on naturalization, some of which
remained until 1952).
120 See INA § 101(a)(15) (describing categories of “nonimmigrants”); NGAI, supra note 57
(describing the creation of the category of illegal aliens).
121 See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 21, at 437–38; MOTOMURA, supra note 4; see also
American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act, § 106, Pub. L. 106-313, 114 Stat.
1251 (2000) (recognizing the transitional status of many who enter initially on an H-1B
nonimmigrant visa).
122 See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (2006)
(creating a legalization program under which more than two million illegal immigrants
obtained green cards); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong.
tit. VI (passed by the Senate on May 25, 2006) (creating large-scale legalization program); INA
117
118
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practical matter these immigrants face a much longer naturalization delay than
those first admitted as LPRs.
Thus, longer naturalization periods might be evidence of attempted
insider lockup. But a lag between admission and the acquisition of voting
rights has a potential upside as well. Legal rules that delay immigrant access to
the franchise (and that make it difficult for insiders to change that rule) can
lessen the likelihood that insiders will attempt to manipulate immigration
policy to advance their own political interests. They do so in two ways. First,
the delay makes it more difficult for insiders to predict the electoral
preferences of immigrants admitted under the system. Their preferences may
be well known at the point of entry, but there will be considerably more
uncertainty about what those preferences will look like years down the road.
In this way naturalization lags operate somewhat as a temporal veil of
ignorance. Second, the delay may reduce the incentive of political insiders to
manipulate the immigration rules in self-interested ways. This is because
political insiders likely have somewhat limited time horizons. While political
parties may lower politician’s discount rates to a certain extent, those
politicians are still unlikely to care as much about elections several electoral
cycles out than they are to care about the next few election cycles. Thus,
naturalization lags may have a salutary effect on the political economy of
migration policy.123
Even putting aside the possibility of insider lock-up, focusing on the
political rights of migrants makes clear that the political economy of migration
policy is much more complicated than is often assumed. Consider policies
concerning wealth redistribution. There is a large literature on the ways in
which immigration and redistributive policies interact. The bulk of the
scholarship focuses on the fiscal consequences of migrants—on whether they
will be net payers or payees in the system.124 But the above discussion shows
that such an approach is incomplete, because immigration policy will (unless
migrants are excluded indefinitely from the political process) affect the
composition of the electorate voting on such policies in the future.125
§ 240A (providing, through “cancellation of removal,” a mechanism for a small number of
unlawful immigrants who satisfy a number of criteria to become legal permanent residents).
123 See Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 4 ELECTION L. J. 412 (2006)
(describing these features of temporal veil rules).
124 See, e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 105–27 (2001).
125 See, e.g., Jess Benhabib, On the Political Economy of Immigration, 40 EUROPEAN ECON. REV.
1737 (1995); Edith Sand & Assaf Razin, The Role of Immigration in Sustaining the Social Security
System: A Political Economy Approach (CESifo Working Paper No. 1979).

6 April 2009

The Rights of Migrants

42

There is some historical evidence that support for immigration policy is
affected by related sorts of interest group dynamics. Consider Claudia
Goldin’s fascinating study of immigration restrictionism during the first two
decades of the twentieth century.126 The study highlights the role immigrants
themselves can play in the political economy of immigration legislation. From
the mid-1890s and until the passage of the National Origins Quota Act in
1921, anti-immigrant forces tried to close the door to immigrants. On several
occasions Congress passed restrictive literacy requirements that were vetoed by
the President. Twice the House managed to override the presidential veto, but
until 1917 both chambers could not together muster the votes needed to write
the literacy requirement into law. Goldin shows that the political power of the
immigrants themselves were a central reason why it took restrictionist forces
twenty years to succeed. Examining city-level data, she finds that increases in
the percentage of foreign born in a city initially raised the possibility that the
city’s representatives in Congress would vote in a restrictionist direction—on
her account, by depressing wage growth and producing a backlash among
native voters. But once the foreign born fractions reached a certain level
though—about 30 percent of the city’s total population—almost all
representatives voted against restriction. This finding “underscores the critical
importance of reinforcing flows of immigration in building and maintaining
the open immigrant vote.”127
Goldin’s work, together with the recent work on immigration and welfare
policy, highlights the twin concerns a state might have about conferring
political rights on migrants: first, that the migrants will change the sorts of
public goods that the state provides; second, that they will affect the state’s
immigration policy itself. These twin concerns point to an overlooked design
possibility: that migrants could be given voting rights with respect to one set of
policies but not the other. This might initially seem implausible, because we
generally don’t think about extending the franchise in issue-specific ways. But
it is important to realize that the most prominent contemporary proposals
concerning noncitizen voting actually do embody this sort of separation.
Today advocates of noncitizen voting argue most vociferously for local
rather than national voting rights. (In fact, a smattering of local governments

See Claudia Goldin, The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the United States, 1890 to
1921, in THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY
223 (1994).
127 See id. at 24 (arguing that flows were reinforcing from 1900 to 1910 but diluting from
1910 to 1920).
126
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around the country have responded and authorized noncitizen voting.)128 The
argument for local voting is usually cast in the language of membership and
obligation: the claim is that noncitizens truly are “members” of their local
community, even though they are not yet full members of the national
community, such that they deserve local voting rights. But our approach
suggests a quite different argument for local but not national voting rights.
Local voting rights give immigrants considerably more control over many of
the local public goods that most directly affect their daily lives—like public
schools, zoning laws, and so forth. But local voting rights give them much less
control over immigration decisions, which are made principally by the national
government. Thus, separating the local and national franchise for noncitizens
may provide a rough and ready mechanism by which the state can give
migrants some control over policies that affect them without raising the
possibility of the immigration feedback loop.
IV. INTERACTION EFFECTS
The basic model in Part II assumed that that there was only one state in
the picture. In reality, multiple host states compete for migrants, especially
wealthy and highly skilled migrants. Moreover, the preferences of sending
states will often interact with receiving state preferences in ways that affect
migrants’ rights. This Part discusses some insights that follow when we relax
the single-state-actor assumption in the basic model.
Before proceeding we should address a conceptual possibility of sending
states bargaining directly with receiving states. In principal, all states could
enter a treaty that provided for migration where migration makes all states
better off. The treaty would provide the terms of admission and the
conditions under which states could deport migrants or otherwise affect their
way of life. Such a treaty would protect country-specific investments by
migrants and would limit the adverse effects from competition for migrants.
Historically such bargaining has sometimes been important; migrants’
rights have often turned on explicit agreements or coordination strategies. In
the United States, migrants’ rights to own property were often regulated
through bilateral arrangements with other nations;129 the rights of Chinese
migrants who sparked the first wave of restrictionist immigration policy in the

128 See, e.g., Gerald Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1092 (1977); Raskin, supra note 31.
129 The process started with the Jay Treaty of 1794.
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United States were also the product of a treaty with China.130 In Europe, the
civil law tradition also often led migrants’ rights to be based on reciprocity
with the country of nationality.131 Today such bargaining between states is less
important than one might expect.132 In fact, a pressing question is why capital
flows are pervasively the subject of bilateral agreements, and trade to
multilateral agreements, but migration flows are much less frequently the
subject of international agreement. Nonetheless, because this question and
others concerning direct bargaining are beyond our framework, we leave them
aside for now.
A. Labor Competition and Market Segmentation
It is a familiar idea that states compete for certain migrants—those with
particular skills, for example.133 It is a less familiar idea that the competition
might affect a state’s design of migration rights. As we have noted at various
points, a state’s optimal choice of migration rule may depend on the choice of
other states. These interactions are sometimes obvious, and sometimes not.
Suppose that a Sending State (say, India) has numerous sophisticated
computer engineers who can earn higher wages in foreign states. Imagine
there is only one possible Receiving State. Employers in the Receiving State
will compete for the engineers and will offer them a wage equal to their
marginal productivity. This will in fact equal the wage of native workers with
the same skills, or perhaps undercut it slightly as the market adjusts to the
influx of labor. Whatever the case, the migrant workers will likely enjoy a
considerable increase in their wage.
Now, the employers may be dissatisfied with this regime for, at least, two
reasons. First, suppose that the Receiving State law provides migrants with
See LUCY SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING
MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995) (describing the Burlingame providing that Chinese
immigrants in the United States would be entitled to same privileges as citizens of most
favored nation).
131 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer, Plural Nationality: Facing the Future in a
Migratory World, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES (Aleinikoff
& Klusmeyer, eds. 2001).
132 Refugee treaties the only kind of multi-lateral agreements relating to migration that are
common today. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
133 See Ayelet Shachar, The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration
Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148 (2006); Petra Zaletel, Competing for the Highly Skilled Migrants:
Implications for the EU Common Approach on Temporary Economic Migration, 12 EUR. L. J. 613
(2006).
130
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few rights, so that migrants make few country-specific investments. As a
result, the migrants are less valuable to the employers than they would
otherwise be. The employers might lobby the Receiving State government to
improve protections for migrants. The costs will be largely borne by other
citizens of Receiving State, who may be unable to organize to resist new
migration laws. Or they might not; it is possible that greater protections for
migrants would benefit nearly everyone or harm people very little.
Second, employers might try to use Receiving State laws to cartelize the
migrant labor market. Because employers must compete for migrants, the
migrants’ wages will be relatively high. But suppose that a new law allows
migrants to stay in the Receiving State only as long as they remain employed
with a particular sponsoring employer.134 Such a rule will greatly decrease the
bargaining power of the migrant once she arrives. To be sure, such a rule
would reduce migration and also country-specific investment; but for
individual employers, the gains could exceed the costs, some of which will be
borne by others.
If, however, the number of possible Receiving Countries increase, then it
will be more difficult for a particular Receiving State that seeks migrant labor
to adopt laws that restrict the rights of migrant workers once they arrive. They
will, in effect, be outbid by other Receiving Countries, which will provide a
more appealing package of rights and privileges—for example, greater
flexibility to change jobs or a much quicker and more certain path to
citizenship. We might predict, then, that as the number of possible Receiving
Countries increases, the legal packages offered to migrants will become more
generous and uniform.
Another hypothesis is that market segmentation will occur. Suppose that
there are two types of Receiving States: those that can easily assimilate
migrants (the United States) and those that cannot easily assimilate migrants
(Japan). It is cheaper for the easy-assimilators to offer generous migration
rights such as quick paths to citizenship. These packages will attract a certain
type of migrant—for example, younger people who seek to start families after
migration. As a result, neither the Receiving State nor employers on its
territory will need to “bribe” the migrant to come by offering generous pay.
By contrast, the difficult-assimilators may have to offer financial inducements
in order to compensate the migrant for the higher risk of removal or other
adverse action. In these countries, guest- or contract-workers might be more
common.
134

109.

Many U.S. employment visa categories significantly restrict job mobility. See supra note
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Finally, consider another interesting asymmetry: some receiving states are
more alike than others. A Brazilian who learns English does not make a
country-specific investment; a Brazilian who learns Japanese does. The
English-speaking Brazilian can obtain work in all the Anglophone countries—
the United States, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and so forth—as
well as the numerous European and other countries where English has
become a lingua franca in the business world. The Japanese-speaking Brazilian
can recover the cost of her investment in only one place as a practical
matter—Japan.135 All else equal, therefore, Japan must offer migrants more
generous rights than an Anglophone country in order to attract them and
persuade them to learn the language. Anglophone countries thus have
immense competitive advantages in the market for migrants: they can attract
many more migrants without offering them generous rights, thus retaining
valuable flexibility.
Not all investments exhibit this interaction effect. For example,
Anglophone countries may still have to offer generous rights to the extent
necessary to encourage migrants to form marital and other emotional bonds
with citizens. These investments in personal relationships are more
consistently country-specific. And their existence has important implications
in light of globalization. To the extent that globalization homogenizes some
basic aspects of societies and increases the dominance of a few languages like
English, Spanish, and Chinese, migration will involve fewer country-specific
investments and migrants need worry less about opportunistic state behavior.
We might predict, therefore, that immigration contracts will become more
flexible in the future as the precommitment problem becomes less severe. Yet
even in a radically globalized world, personal and social relationships will
continue to be important country-specific investments for which many
migrants will demand protection.136
B. Dual Citizenship
Dual citizenship exists when a person is the citizen of two countries.
Some nations permit dual citizenship and even citizenship in more than two
countries; Canada, France, and the Unite Kingdom, for example, have
historically been open to plural citizenship.137 Other nations, such as Austria
See supra text accompanying notes 46–47.
This would not be true, of course, in a world where physical proximity was unimportant
for these relationships. But despite the rise of social networking and a variety of other forms
of relationships in the virtual world, primacy of presence is almost certainly going to be central
to human relationships for a long time.
137 See Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer, supra note 131, at 76–77.
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and Japan, have more restrictive regimes. Austria requires naturalizing
immigrants to expatriate themselves from their countries of origin; Japan even
requires those who acquire dual citizenship at birth to choose a single
nationality before they turn twenty-two.138 The phenomenon of dual
citizenship raises some interesting questions within our framework.
Consider an example that simplifies the law but also brings out clearly the
differences between the approaches. A person migrates from a Sending State
to a Receiving State. Under the single citizenship approach, the Receiving
State grants the migrant citizenship rights only if she renounces her citizenship
of the Sending State. Under the dual citizenship approach, the Receiving State
grants the migrant citizenship rights even if she does not renounce her
citizenship of the Sending State. Note that the Sending State faces the same
choices: it can withdraw citizenship from migrants who accept Receiving State
citizenship or it can permit dual citizenship. Thus, a person can have dual
citizenship only when her sending and receiving state permit it. How might
the Receiving State and the Sending State choose among these two
approaches?
The main difference between the two approaches, from the Receiving
State’s perspective, is that the dual citizen maintains the right to the protection
of the Sending State. In practice, this right could mean different things. At a
minimum, the migrant retains an exit option—the option to leave Receiving
State and resettle in the Sending State if conditions in Receiving State turn
unfavorable.139 This right is clearly more valuable than the simple right to
leave retained by the non-dual citizen because she may not be able to find an
appealing country to accept her if she chooses to leave, and usually the
Sending State, as her native land, will be the most appealing alternative to the
Receiving State. Dual citizenship could offer other protections. The migrant
might have access to diplomatic protection of the Sending State, for example,
if the Receiving State violates her rights.140

See id. at 77.
To be sure, even for dual citizens the exit option is often not absolute. Sending States
sometimes refuse to permit emigrants to return home—though this is most common in
deportation contexts. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); William Glaberson, Release
of 17 Guantanamo Detainees Sputters as Officials Debate Risk, NY TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, at A20.
140 As a formal matter, international law may prohibit diplomatic intervention in some such
cases. See 1930 Convention Concerning Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of
Nationality, Art. 4 (“A State may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its national against
a State whose nationality such person also possesses.”). But this formal rule will often not
stop a citizen for requesting state protection or a state from coming to a citizen’s aid. See
Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer, supra note 131, at 73–75.
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From the Sending State’s perspective, allowing outgoing migrants to
retain citizenship creates obligations for the state without any immediate
benefits. The Sending State has an obligation to accept the migrant if she
returns and perhaps also to offer diplomatic aid and protection in Receiving
State. Thus, the Sending State is more likely to grant dual citizenship rights if
it wishes to encourage emigration, or if believes that it benefits from
maintaining ties with those who would choose to emigrate regardless of the
Sending State’s policy.141
From an ex ante perspective—that is, at the time of migration—the
Receiving State must weigh the competing effects on country-specific
investment and flexibility. On the one hand, a migrant who is allowed to
retain dual citizenship will have greater bargaining power once she arrives. For
example, she may be able to persuade the Sending State to put pressure on the
Receiving State if the Receiving State is inclined to deprive migrants of certain
rights or to ignore their interests. Thus, a state may strengthen its
precommitment, and hence encourage country-specific investment, by
allowing the migrant to draw on the resources of the Sending State. Moreover,
permitting a naturalizing immigrant to retain her prior citizenship lowers the
cost of naturalization, because she is not required to forfeit formal ties to her
homeland that she might value. This may spur naturalization and bring greater
country-specific investment.142 Of course, an immigrant’s maintenance of her
original citizenship could also undermine her incentive to engage in countryspecific investment because she is more likely to retain ties to the sending state
and to see the option of returning there as valuable.143 Whatever the ultimate
141 In recent years, a number of emigration-encouraging states in South East Asia, Africa,
and elsewhere have relaxed their citizenship policies to permit dual citizenship (or sometimes
dual nationality) for citizens living abroad. See Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of
Citizenship in an Emigrant Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11, 49–50 (2006) (discussing changes in
this direction by the Philippines, Turkey, and India); Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen, International
Migration and Sending Countries: Key Issues and Themes, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND
SENDING COUNTRIES: PERCEPTIONS, POLICIES, AND TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 3, 19 (Eva
Østergaard, ed. 2003) (discussing dual citizenship policies in Latin America, Africa, and South
East Asia). For a general discussion about why states may benefit from these ties and about
what strategies they use to maintain them, see Symposium: A Tribute to the Work of Kim Barry: The
Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. (2006).
142 There is some evidence that traditionally restrictive countries like Sweden have begun to
allow dual citizenship in an effort to increase immigrant integration—that is, to promote
country-specific investments by migrants. See Tanja Brøndsted Sejersen, “I Vow to Thee My
Counrties”—The Expansion of Dual Citizenship in the 21st Century, 42 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 523,
535 (2008).
143 Compare Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L. J. 1435
(1997) (arguing that the retention of a former nationality will not slow assimilation) with
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effect on levels of investment over time, dual citizenship will afford the
migrant more power to prevent the Receiving State from making needed
policy changes in response to crises or changes in preferences of native
citizens. If the migrant remains loyal to the Sending State, and the crisis
involves a breakdown in the relationship between the two countries, the
migrant’s citizenship-derived political power in the Receiving State may be
deeply unattractive for the native citizens of that country.
Seen in this way, dual citizenship appears as just another right that, like
basic rights, the right to stay, and participation rights, can be used to encourage
migrants to enter and make country-specific investments but that, by the same
token, tie the hands of the Receiving State and prevent it from modifying its
demos if events change.144
But dual citizenship also has distinctive features. Unlike the other rights,
its value for the migrant (and hence for the Receiving State as a commitment
device) is a function of the interests and diplomatic power of the Sending
State. The value of dual citizenship for the migrant is high when two
conditions are met. First, the Sending State is powerful enough that its
diplomatic pressure on behalf of the migrant will affect the policies of the
Receiving State. Second, the Sending State has an interest in protecting its
overseas diaspora.
The first factor is straightforward; the second is more complex. Why
would the Sending State have an interest in protecting emigrants? There are a
number of interconnected answers: to reduce population pressures, to obtain
remittances, to establish links with other countries, to meet a demand for
employment opportunities abroad. None of these possible motives is
necessarily clear, however.
Consider the Sending State’s interest in
remittances. On the one hand, by protecting emigrants, it encourages them to
make country-specific investments, which should lead to higher wages and
thus higher remittances. On the other hand, by protecting emigrants and
encouraging them to make country-specific investments, it may cause them to
become more deeply assimilated, and thus to lose their loyalty to the old
country and the people who live there—driving down remittances.
A number of propositions follow. One is that, all else equal, countries
with high internal demand for emigration will be more likely to permit
migrants to become dual citizens, and countries with high demand for
SCHUCK, supra note 4, at 238 (questioning Spiro’s claim and suggesting that there is little
evidence about the effect of dual nationality on assimilation rates).
144 See generally Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer, supra note 131, at 77 (discussing some other reasons
why a state’s openness to dual citizenship may turn on whether the country is one of
immigration or emigration).
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immigration will be more likely to permit migrants to become dual citizens.
But our main point is different, and is taken from our discussion of
participation rights. The Receiving State will be more likely to permit dual
citizenship if it does not believe that the Sending State will use diplomatic
pressure to advance the interests of migrants in a manner than injures the
Receiving State.145 As noted above, the likelihood that the Sending State will
do this depends both on its interests and its power. The Receiving State need
not worry about a weak Sending State; it also need not worry if the Sending
State’s migrant-derived interests do not differ much from the interests of the
Receiving State. This is most likely when the migrants have political
preferences that are similar to those of Receiving State native citizens.
The possible interaction problems can be multiplied indefinitely. We have
already discussed how states might compete with child-citizenship rights.146
Problems could also arise where conflicting citizenship rules lead to children
having no citizenship—for example, if the two parents are from different
countries, each of which grants citizenship rights only to children with two
parents from that country.147 These problems—some of which are interesting,
others of which are simply confusing—are best left to future work.
C. Refugees and Asylum-Seekers
Interaction effects are also important for refugee law. Refugees typically
flee civil wars and other forms of political, religious, and ethnic conflict. By
accepting refugees, Receiving States essentially grant them exit options that are
conditional on the domestic conflict reaching a threshold level of severity.
From the perspective of refugees or potential refugees, the exit option is
of mixed value. On the one hand, the availability of refugee status gives one
the ability to escape a dangerous situation. On the other hand, a person who is
inclined to stay and fight will find that others will leave rather than join the
145 The flip side is that sending states will be more likely to permit dual citizenship if they
believe their citizens will use their political influence in the Receiving State to benefit the
Sending State. There is some evidence that this motivation played a part in Mexico’s recent
decision to permit emigrants naturalized abroad to retain their Mexican nationality. See Barry,
supra note 141, at 46–47; see also Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, Politics of Migrants’ Transnational
Political Practices, 37 INT’L MIGRATION REVIEW 760, 765 (2003) (describing, in the context of
U.S.-Latin American relations, “attempts of sending country governments and elites to co-opt
nationals abroad in an attempt to tap into their various economic and political resources”).
146 See supra Part III.B.
147 This citizenship coordination problem led to attempts during the twentieth century to
craft an international legal solution. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89.
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fight if refugee status is available. So liberal refugee laws will encourage flight
and might also increase the incentive for governments or other groups to try
to drive out populations that are not loyal to them, including ethnic minorities.
In this fashion, the policies of the receiving (asylum) state interact with
those of the sending state. Nonetheless, despite the potential theoretical costs
of undermining resistance movements and encouraging strategic behavior by
governments in conflict-ridden states, in practice the humanitarian costs of
civil war and domestic persecution are often too great for other countries to
deny refugee status as a formal matter.
But this leads to a second interaction effect—one between the potential
receiving states. These states may all want refugees to have an available place
of asylum, but each state would prefer that the refugees be taken in by another
state. Moreover, because the cost of refugee flows fall disproportionately on
neighboring countries, they may threaten to deny entrance unless other
countries either accept a share of the refugee population or offer financial
incentives. Recognizing this collective action problem, countries have
developed various cooperation mechanism, including treaties.148
There is also the problem of distinguishing sincere refugees from other
migrants, such as economic migrants. Refugee status can be quite valuable:
while refugees in many countries are confined to camps near the border of
their home country, in countries like the United States refugees are given
generous rights, including work permits and the ability to become lawful
permanent residents and then citizens.149 Consequently, much refugee law and
policy are concerned with screening for valid refugee claims and deterring
invalid ones.150 Where there are many potential asylum states, their screening
policies may interact. States with more stringent standards for asylum are
See Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Restructured Safe Havens: A Proposal for Reform of the Refugee
Protection System, 22 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 1 (2000); James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve,
Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented
Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115 (1997); Peter H. Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest
Proposal, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 243 (1997).
149 See INA § 208(c)(1)(B) (requiring the Attorney General to provide work authorization to
successful asylum applicants); INA § 209(a) (permitting asylees to adjust their status to that of
a lawful permanent resident after one year).
150 To be sure, many states also attempt to deter claimants who can clearly establish their
status as refugees. This is in part because of the collective action problem identified above:
states would prefer that even valid refugees end up in some other state. The desire to deter
valid claimants is also driven by perceived capacity constraints. For example, when faced with
the mass influx of potential refugees from Cuba and Haiti, the United States has adopted
interdiction policies and refugee screening procedures that seem deliberately designed to
screen out high numbers of valid applicants. See Joyce A. Hughes, Flight from Cuba, 36 CAL. W.
L. REV. 39 (1999).
148
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likely to attract more applicants with strong claims, because those with weaker
claims are less likely to satisfy the stringent standard. Those with weaker
applications will be more likely to seek asylum in states with a lower bar. This
means that a state’s optimal refugee screening rules will depend on the rules in
other receiving states. Without coordination, this interaction could lead to a
race to the bottom, in which all states adopt screening policies that are
excessively stringent.151
CONCLUSION
We have only scratched the surface of a complex topic, but we hope that
the perspective we offer will help other scholars analyze other aspects of
migration law. We see many directions for future research, including the
following three.
First, we have offered two basic models that greatly simplify the problem
of optimal migration law. In an earlier paper, we treated the relationship
between the receiving country and the migrant as akin to an employment
relationship, where the migrant has private information about her “type” and
the receiving country must devise mechanisms for discovering that
information.152 In this paper, we treat the relationship as a generic contractual
relationship, where the receiving country seeks to attract entry and investment
while retaining some flexibility, and the migrant must decide whether to invest.
There are other possible approaches to the basic relationship, and focus can be
turned on other variables than we have just touched on—such as the value of
the migrant’s exit option and the extent to which that exit option limits the
receiving country’s policy choices.
Second, there are numerous immigration rules that are of great
importance but whose incentive effects have received little attention. For
example, various rules limit the employment options of foreign students,
tourists, and spouses of migrants. These rules deserve more attention.
Finally, the topic of “interaction effects” is of great importance but also
has received little attention. States compete and cooperate with respect to
migration in complex ways. What determines the conditions under which
See Ryan Bubb, Michael Kremer, & David Levine, The Economics of International Refugee Law
(WCFIA working paper 2008), available at http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/2741
(modeling the refugee system and suggesting that “as more states use a high standard of proof,
the best response of other states may be to increase their standard of proof”); Jenny Monheim
& Marie Obidzinski, Optimal Discretion in Asylum Lawmaking (working paper 2007), available at
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/ulpsbbeta/2007-31.htm (same).
152 Cox & Posner, supra note 8.
151
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states grant dual citizenship? How does competition for migrants affect the
determination of rights? Why is it that in the past many states restricted the
rights of native citizens to emigrate, and why is that so rare today? Why do
states offer different types of rights to people from different countries? We
have suggested some angles for approaching these questions, but much work
remains to be done before satisfactory answers are reached.
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